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ABSTRACT 
Current views and models about attention regard man as a 
'transmitter channe. 1' and try to characteripe the properties 
of that 'odd channel'. Another characteristic of the current 
views is that attention is regarded as a specific mental 
operation in a person which can be described, irrespective of 
the purposes of the subject. 
By contrast we examine attention as an activity at the service 
of the purposes of the person. Attention is examined as an 
activity by means of which the field of consciousness is 
structured around the 'object of attention'. 4This object of 
attention is not a specific 'atimulus' but a system in the 
sense of General System Theory. Hence, the approach is mainly 
holistic in character. Activity is looked upon as an INTERTRAFFIC 
between the person and his relation with the world. And where 
I 
there is relatedness, information theory, in a cybernetic sense, 
can be used. The approach developed benefits of the advantages 
from previous models allowing also for a better explanation of 
the limitation present in the cognitive realm without appeal to 
some 'filter mechanism' in the physiological structure of a 
person. 
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CHAPTER, 
INT RODUCT ION 
[11 
When I first undertook the task of considering the phenomenon 
of attention as the one for analysis and consideration I was not 
totally aware of all its implication. Besides, coming as I do from 
the medical sciences, speciLically neurophysiology, my first impulse 
was only to look for some useful correlations between 'attentive 
behaviour' and some electrophysiological responses worth looking at. 
My 'immersion' in-a cybernetics department changed my pers- 
pective of the subject, but certainly not i=ediately. The study of 
attention in the modern interpretations of Broadbent, Treissman, the 
Deutsch, Moray, etc., (mainly 'filter theory') and its relation to 
cybernetics seemed to me so interesting that at the beginning I was 
blinded to seeing alternative useful interpretations as well as to 
the possibility of challenging the premises. 
All the above mentioned theories make use of concepts and 
techniques borrowed from information theory which gives some respec- 
tability, conciseness and consistency to the field. But I learned 
from my logical studies that to cast doubt upon an argument is 
either to dispute whether the conclusion follows from accepted 
premises, (that is, the soundness of the inferences from premises 
to conclusion) or to challenge the assertion of the premises. This 
task seemed enormous, so I retreated to re-study both the fundamentals 
of cybernetics and the bases of the so called mental activity. 
It was not until sometime later that I started to see alternative 
ways of approaching the problem. But again a host of interrelated 
questions in both fields crop up (causality, teleology, intentio-nality, 
goal, purposes). 
The present work even when mainly concerned with an analysis of 
attention ought to start by introducing the conception of cybernetics 
and mental activity upon which the analysis is based; if only because 
the study in isolation of the phenomenon of attention has reduced most 
of these studies to rather trivial mechanisms. It is desirable to 
adopt a framework in which apparently separable higher mental faculties 
are seen as various manifestations of a single more inclusive phenomer-C-1., 
namely cognition. The separation of one cognitive faculty from the 
totality of cognitive processes results in the abandonment of the 
original problem and to the search for mechanisms that implement entirely 
different functions that may or may not have any semblance to the pro- 
cesses that involve the totality of the organ-; s-r-n. 
The basic approach, we suggest, is to look at the organism as a 
totality even when this totality belongs to Or,. e type and is limited by 
other totalities. The orgmiism constitutes a whole. The work in 
system analysis (von Bertalanffy, 1968) and Cybernetics (Wiener, 1948) 
has pointed to the idea that, for the study of a complicated sort of 
system as the whole organism, we require an holistic view. This view 
in itself is not very encouraging. The study of the 'whole' is a 
daunting prospect. But the nature of the whole is such that it cannot 
be studied as a whole any more than the physiologist can study the 
human body as a whole. We start with a tentatively 'isolated' part. 
In order to understand the part, however, we must go on to other parts. 
As we extend our investigations and as the relationships which the 
part has to the whole become clearer, we are compelled to modify our 
original conclusions about the nature of the part when it was considered 
in relative isolation. For example, whatever ý, -e know about audition or 
vision as a consequence of analysing its function in isolation assules 
a different significance when it is studied as an instrument or' the 
organism as aw. hole. This involves a ccntinual revision of our knowledge 0 
1) 
as it goes from part to part until the systematic nature of the whole 
is revealed. The development of knowledge is from the abstract to 
the concrete. The part is an abstraction, the whole is concrete. it 
may be conceivable that our sense of the complications in the study 
of the whole is itself one of the consequences of being educated in 
an intellectual c limate where the accepted scientific method is 
atomistic rather than holistic. 
It is quite common in attempting to produce a conceptual analysis 
to look into logic and mathematics as an ideal. This task impels us 
-to take only logico-semantical relationships in establishing the artic- 
ulations of concepts and their outer boundaries. From this point of 
view the relations among the concepts is fixed a priori, we are led 
to pay attention only to semantical considerations, without any 
iact. The search is only reference to extra-conceptual, empirical 
for precision and logical necessity. 
The sort of reflecticrN-7hich we call "cybernetic" cannot sinlplj 
precede empirical discovery and lay out the field of the possible and 
impossible (contra Ashby). It can only be a reflection on empirical 
findings, raising questions about their interpretation, about the 
connections between them, about the problems they raise or 
help to 
solve. 
This kind of enterpriselooking only for precision and 
logical 
necessity, has led into special difficulties. -The 
difficulties have 
to do with the fact that in the characterization of a phenomenon a 
variety of determinants are involved, the most 
important of them 
being regularity (general laws) and consensus, general agreement. 
Both are crucial in the standard concept of any phenomenon. 
ýIost 
of the time we take any one of them not only as necessary 
but as 
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sufficient. The're is no logical link between the above two factors. 
The two factors can, in principle, lead separate ways. There is no 
reason, in logic, why the two f actors have to coo together. 1"lormally 
it is asked which of the factors is the decisive one. If both are 
conjointly required, then it may be asked "just what are their 
relative roles and contributions 
In most of our everyday psychological concepts we cannot make 
a tidy demarcation ruling as to what relative contribution or concep- 
tual weight is to be carried by each one of several factors linked 
together in one of common concepts. 
AX 
i4any of the concepts used in thinking about a phenomenon are of 
a mixed character and this concurrence in a concept rests on empirical 
foundations. Some examples of thi's are: 
a) PPRkC, '1 ý, 7S as a fusion of mind and body. Quoting from Strawson 
(1959) the concept of a person is the concept of a type of- entity 
such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and 
predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics,, a physical situation 
etc are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type. 
What I mean by saying that this concept is primitive can be put in a 
number of ways.. One way is to return to those two questions I asked 
earlier: viz. (1) why are states of consciousness ascribed to anythimg, 
at all ? and (2) why are they ascribed to the very same thing as certain 
corporeal characteristics, a certain physical situation etc ?I 
remC-2. rked at the beginning that it was not to be supposed that the 
answers to these questions were independent of each other. Now I shall 
say that they are connected in this way: that a necessary condition 
of states of consciousness being ascribed at all is that they should 
be ascribed to the very same things as certain corporeal characteristics, 
a certain physical situation etc. That is to say,, states of 
consciousness could not be ascribed at all, unless they were ascribed 
to persons, in the sense I have claimed for this word. We are tempted 
to think of a person as a sort of compound of two kinds of subjects: 
a subject of experience (a pure consciousness, an ego) on the one hand 
and a subject of corporeal attributes on the other".... "The concept 
of a person is logically prior to that of an individual consciousness. 
The concept of a person is not to be analysed as that of an animated 
body or an embodied anima". 
BEL=, as a blending of mentalistic dispositions to think 
and overt dispositions to action. Quoting from Armstrong (1973) 0 
(Ramsey) attributes two characteristics to belief: it is a map, 
and it is something by which we steer. "If we think of belief s as 
maps, then we can think of the totality of a man's beliefs at a 
particular time as a single great map of which the individual belief s 
are sub-maps. The great map will embrace all space and all time, past, 
present and future,, together with anything else the believer takes to 
exist, but it will have, as its central reference point the believer's 
present self. " "This great map, which is continually being added to 
and continually being taken away from as long as the believer lives, 
is a map within his mi-nd. " "The belief-map will include a map of ý, the 
believer's own mind, and even, as a sub-part of this sub-part, a map 
of the believer's belief-map (that is, his beliefs that he holds 
certain beliefs). But this entails no vicious infinite regress. If 
you try to make a complete map of the world and therefore try to 
include in the map a complete map of the map itself, you will be 
involved in an infinite series of maps of maps. But since the 
belief-map is not a complete map of the world, and since the map of 
5 
itself that it contains is even more incomplete, the situation is no 
worse than those actual pictures which contain, as part of the scene 
pictured, 'little pictures of themselves. 
"In the case of ordinary maps a distinction can be drawn between 
the map itself, and the map-reader's interpretation of the map. '. 4o 
such distinction can be drawn in the case of beliefs. We do not read 
off our interpretation of re. ality from the data supplied by our beliefs. 
Our beliefs are our interpreL-ation of reality".. . ""seliefs are -o be 
n 
thought of as maps which carry the interpretations of reality within 
themselves. 
"Beliefs are maps by -which we steer. Unlike entertained propositions, 
beliefs are action guidinc;. Entertained propositions are like fanciful C; 
maps, idly scrawled out. But beliefs are maps of the world in the light 
of which we are prepared to act. " 
Several of our critical psychological concepts are polymorphous 
(Ryle, White) or multicriterial (Rescher, 1973) and fact-organized. ' 
(1) They are polymorphous or multicriterial because a plurality 
of in principle separable components enter in. 
(2) They are fact-organized because the theoretically separable 
facts are held together in an integrative fusion by facts or purported 
facts (i. e., by a view of how the world actually works). 
In our specific case - attention - both factors: a mutual state 
and a behavioural activity, must come together before it is proper to 0 
speak of 'attending'. The ascription of a mental state alone is not 
sufficient to establish that a person attends to something if his 
every act denies -this. But on the other hand behavioural activity 
alone will not settle the matter either, for if there is sufficient 
evidence that his mental State. indicates in every conceivable way 
that he is not attending then the behaviour is irrelevant. All of 
the appropriate facts must be co-present before we can unproblematic 
speak of attention. Otherwise we could not appropriately say purely 
and simply that X attends to S, but would have to use some suitably 
complex circumlocution, "X while not perceivin,, -- or thinking about S 
acts as though it were" or "X, though perceiving or thinking about 
S does not behave in an accordant fashion", or something on these 
lines. 
In nonstandard cases such circumlocutions are always necessary. 
In the standard cases the various criteria! factors innust work 
together. At the base of such a concept, lies an empirically ilrlpliCit 
S4 co-ordination'that places the various critical factor into a 
reciprocally corroborative relationship. Our concepts are, in general, 
"theory presupossing". The theory at issue is such that, things 
being as they are, certain factors always or standardly work together 
in mutual presence. 
Concepts of the kind noted above rest on presuppositions whose 
aim is factual reflecting a view of how things go in the world. 2 (ý 0 
Such concepts are developed and deployed against a fundamentally 
empirical background. In this way the theory does not impel us to 
make up our mind as to which of the plurality of factors involved 
is 
ultimately determinative or decisive. 
In conclusion we can say that many of the psychological concepts 
of central interest are "collage-like": they Care internally diver- 
sified combinations of logically separable elements that are 
held 
together by the bond of a theoretical view of the empirical facts. 
Such concepts rest in an essential way on an. =. Dirically 
based, 
fact-pervaded vision of how things work in the vorld. 
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When the analysis of such fact-organised concepts is at issue 
we cannot make a neat separation bet-ween analytic and empirical 
truths. With these concepts (i. e. , attention) semantical and f act, -, a'- 
considerations become intertwined. Of course, pure analysis can bring 
the fact-request aspect of the concept to '. Light, but it can in no way 
lessen or remove this empirical aspect. 
The acceptance of this conceptual scheme -ýeans that our concepts 
are not framed to suit every possible world bi,., --ý significant measure 
are adjustable to this one. Such inseparability of empirical from 
logico-conceptual considerations constitute an important theme in 
Kant (cf. Strawson, 1966). 
One important consequence of the above view is that i-, " -.. 7e are 
serious enoucrh about the descriptive clarification of the way in which 0 
we standardly use certain psychologically central concepts, we cannot 
avoid the task of investigating the 'view of raality' that underlies 
them and provides their indispensable foundation. And this inquiry- 
is in significant measure empirical and not purely semantico-analytical. 
The classical approach to study mental actiVity consists in the 
study of the processes of cognition, will, sensation, etc. In this 
way it is considered that all these processes are given directly and 
initially, and that a detailed analysis of mental processes can lead 
directly to the knowledge of the laws of human mental life and to the 
elucidation of the distinctive features of our behaviour. 
Although the active participation of the subject is acknowledged, 
the psychologist's and layman notion of personality, is constructed 
out of the concepts of mental processes. in a sense the subject's 
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personality is an arbitrary concept, deduced from the special concepts 
of human mental activity, but nevertheless it is proclaimed as the 
origin and basis of a subject's mental life. 
There is no doubt, however, that it is the subject himself, and 
not the individual mental acts, that takes part in his active relation- 
ships with the outside world. If this fact is taken as the starting 
point, we must start-not with the concept of individual mental processes, 
but with the concept of the subject himself as a whole - who when 
taking part in some form of interaction with the outside world, becomes 
forced to employ his individual mental processes. 
The starting point in the study of cognition has been the concept 
of mental states, ý7hich are not phenomena of concrete mental activity, 
but which are undoubtedly abstract, radically separate from the living 
reality of the subject's activity. However, our primary task should 
be the study of this activity for it is the basis out of which arises 
the whole structure of mental function. 
We are compelled to undertake the analysis and study of the 
principles of the subject's activity insofar as this activity is the 
basis on which mental life grows and develops. With this interpre- 
tation of the subject's mental activity, we must begin the task by 
investigating the subject (the person-ality) as a whole and not the 
individual elements of his mental activity. The study of this sphere 
of reality will show us that the mental activity of a subject, 
essentially, consists of further specifications or definitions of the 
subject, definitions of. his integral personalitY2 i. e., definition 
of a person. (Strawson,, 1959). 
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In examining the problem of attention and cognition in general, 
we have to consider the significance of the notion of activity in 
any interpretation of how these processes are determined. 
Two approaches are generally used to tackle this question. One 
of them postulates the direct dependence of those phenomena on the 
various influences exerted upon a subject receptive system. The main 
task of resecarching this approach is to establish the quantitative 
dependence of sensations on the physical parameters of the stimuli 
affecting the sense organs. This research ils thus based on the 
Istimulus-r-esponse' pattern. 
The limitations of this approach lie in its model of a passive 
subject influenced by a world of objects. In other words, this 
approach ignores the significant element of the actual relations of 
the subject with the outside world; it ignores his activity. Such 
abstraction is, of course, admissible, but only within the bounds of 
an experiment intended to discover certain properties of elementary 
structures and functions contributing to the realization of certain 
mental processes. The moment one goes beycnd these narrow limits, 
however, one realises the inadequacy of this approach, and it was 
this that compelled some early scholars to explain psychological 
facts on the basis of special forces; such as that of active 
apperception (Leibnitz). According to Leibnitz 'apperception' must 
be added to perception to produce a conscious sensation, and he 
repeatedly mentions 'attention' as a factor determining what will 
and will not be 'apperceived'. This appeal to the active nature of 
the subject, even in its later elaborated form (Wundt) , was made only 
in a mystical form. 
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In order to overcome the difficulties created by the postulates 
of immediacy underlying the approach mentionec-7 above, some scholars 
have stressed that the effects of external influences are determined 
not immediately by the influences themselves, 'ut depend on their 
'refraction' by the subject. 
In other words, it is emphasized that e-: -. arnal causes act through 
the medium of internal conditions. But this notion can be inter- 
preted in various ways depending on what ; -s -. -Eant 
by internal conditions. 
If they are taken to mean a change in the inte=-"al states of the 
organism, the notion offers us nothing new. object can change its 
states and hence manifest itself in different -,, 7ays in its interaction 
with other objects. A hungry animal reacts _LO -,; '-ood differently from . 
one that is well fed. It is another matter if by 'internal conditions' 
we mean the special feature of processes that are active in the organism. 
But we can ask: what are these processes that --ediate the influences of 
the outside world reflected in the brain ? 
The answer to this question lies, we wouL_i say, in acknowledging 
that these processes are those that realise an organism's actual life 
in the world by which "Lie is surrounded, his social being in all the 
richness and variety of its-forms. In other wcrds,, these processes 
are his activity. By activity, we do not r-ean the dynamics of the 
nervous, physiological or machine process that realise this activity. 
A distinction must be drawn between the dynamics and structure of 
mental processes and the language that describes them, and the 
dynamics and the structure of the person's activity and the language 
describing them. 
The life of each individual is made up o-F a system of successive 
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activities. It is in activity that the transition or 'translation' of 
the object into the subjective mental state takes place; at the same 
time it is also in activity that the transition is achieved from the 
subjective mental state into activity's objective results. Regarded 
from this angle, activity is a process of intertraffic between OPPOSite 
poles, subject, and object. 
ActIvity is a non-additive unit of ýhe corporeal, material life 
of the material organism. In the narrower ser-se, i. e., on the 
psychological plane, it is a unit of life, meciated by a mental state 
whose real function is the orientate the organism in the world. 
[41 
Reports of cognitive functions fall into di ! ': ferent groups. Some 
report something of a dispositional nature - t1laey do not imply anything 
about the person's present state of consciousness. Such reports could 
be true of them even if they were not conscious at that time at all - 
for instance, if they were asleep. 
But other cognitive reports do seem to report something about a 
person's present state of consciousness. Reports that someone is now 
paying attention (though not necessarily all reports that may be called 
attentional reports) seem to be of this latter kind. To pay attention 
is to be in a certain phenomenal state of mind. 
We can consider attention from a merely phenomenal point of view. 
We can talk about the physical effects attention have on those persons 
paying attention. But then we notice that these phenomena differ from 
other phenomenal states of mind such as bodily sensations, in that they 
are in some way directed. So we can ask what is involved in this. 
What do we mean when we say that a mental activity such as attention 
IZ 
has a directionality but a sensation does not ? In what way is 
someone's activity directed ? How does the directedness come in ? 
What determines the particular direction ? 
If we approach the question in this phenomenal -setting, we seem 
to be looking for some feature of the mental activity themselves, 
some feature of the phenomenal states of mind. What is this feature ? 
It was this sort of question that led Brentano to formulate his theory 
of intentionality. Brentano say--: 
"Every mental phenomenon is characterised by what the scho. lastics 
of the Middle Ages called the intentional (and also mental) inexistence 
of an object, and what we could call, although in not entirely unalw- 
biguous terms, the reference to a content, a direction upon an object 
(by which we are not to understand a reality in this case), or an 
immanent objectivity. Each one includes something as object within 
itself., although not always in the same way. " 
But again we can ask: what does it mean to say that a mental 
state refers to a content, or is directed upon an object ? How does 
it do this ? 
Brentano allows that the object need not exist, and this seems 
quite natural if we approach matters in this way. When we try to analyse 
mental activity as thinking, where sometimes the object does not exist 
in the outside world, the directedness still seems to be there. This 
leads us to conclude that the existence of an appropriate item in the 
world and the relation of the mental activity to this item is not 
really relevant to the inquiry. We have been considering mental 
activity from a phenominal point of view, and then asking what its 
object-directedness consists of. We have taken the mental activity., 
and tried to discover when and, how it hooked onto an object. The 
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fact that it makes no difference to the mental activity whether the 
object exists or not, tends to lead to an internalising of the object, 
with the consequent difficulties about the relation between the 
internalised object and items in the outside world. Indeed, the fact 
that mental activity relates to items in the outside world at all may 
appear mysterious. 
The alternative approach we advocate, whicn riay prove more profi- 
table is to st. art With a person and an item I_n 4 the world, and explore 
the relation between them. Persons and items in the world may be 
related in all sorts of ways. But sometimes a person and an item in 
the world are so related that the person has an actual present concern 
with that item. We can ask what has to be the case for this to be so. 
For example, if the item is an event, we can ask what has to be the 
case for the person to be reacting or respondizg to that event. Given 
that a person does have a present concern with an item in the world, 
we can look to see what determines the nature of that concern. We can 
ask what the particular force is of calling thiat item the object of 
the'person's mental activity. Even if an event elicits a response in 
a person, the event cannot necessarily be called the object of that 
activity. Thus we take as our starting-point a person and an item in 
the world, and sketch in the relation between them. 
Now, items Ln the world - people, objects, events, states of 
affairs, etc., -may bear different relations to one another. Thus 
any two people may be related as teacher to student, father to son 
or in many other ways. In our case, we are interested in the nature 
of a person's activity: object relation. There are many sorts of 
relations; for example spatia'L and temporal relations, relations of 
similarity and difference. But we are more interested in-exploring 
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relaýions that explain what it is for two items in the world to be 
related as a person's activity to object. 
In summary we maintain: the view of attention which considers only 
its phenomenon aspects lead to blind alleys, when we come to consider 
how some of the attentional characteristics i. e. directness - can 
have a relation to items in the outside world. - The approach that 
looks more profitable is to study the relation of a person with the 
world - his activity - to explain the phenomenon better. Important 
as it is, the analysis of activity must not rest only on logic- 
semantics relationships. The analysis always 'refers-back' to a 
view of how things 'go on in the world'. It is empirical facts 
which hold together and keep an 'invariance' in any purported analysis 
of a phenomenon. 
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CHAPTER ii 
CYBERNETICS 
Ell 
Cybernetics was the term coined in 1948 in the publication of 
Norbert Wiener's Cybernetics or Control and Cc-, munication in the 
Animal and the Machine. Of course, many of the procedures and theories 
which are today considered part of cybernetics (e. g., data transmission, 
control theory) had been developed prior to this time. We can indicate 
as a first approximation, that cybernetics deals mainly with control 
processes and with the reception, transmission and processing of 
mess-ages in complex, dynamic systems, whether they be technological 
systems, animals or social systems, and this is done with the help of 
scientific methods. (This characterization is similar to the one 
advanced by Wiener). 'Messages' has to be taken in its most general 
sense, viz.. as processes or things with particular structures which ' 
play a role in these systems. 
The development of cybernetics and the extensive use ýof his 
mathematical apparatus has proved successful in different areas. In, 
psychology in particular one of the central notions of cybernetics, 
that of information, has been widely used to analyse different aspects 
of cognition: learninc,, -perception, mem-ory and so on. Further elab- 
oration and refining of the notion of information resulted in an inter- 
pretation of other cybernetics notions like goal and feedback into 
'informational terms'. Hence the notion of information is rather 
central to cybernetics. Sayre (1976) has expressed the above idea 
explicitly "(information) ... concepts are appropriate 
for the explan- 
ation of both physical and mental events, and they provide the basis 
for a conceptual framework in which activities of both sorts can be 
coherently related (p 14)". 
Questions about information have not only arisen in the context 
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of cybernetics or information theory. They have also come up in 
diverse contexts. One often hears information mentioned in reference 
to the natural and social sciences, and in technology. As a result 
there are many meanings - some technical, some from ordinary language - 
for the term 'information'. And this ambigU4 ity brings with it a whole 
series of problems. We ought to start then with a short account of 
the notion of information. 
In Latin 'aliquid informare' originally meant to form, to shape, 
etc. 'Info-rmatiol, therefore, indicated the activity of giving form 
to something. 
In a figurative sense 'aliquid informare' also means to form an 
image or representation of something, i. e., to imagine something. In 
reference to the. result of this imaging, then 'aliquid informatum 
habere' means to have an image of something. The original and derived 
meanings of info---rmare have this in common - that an image of someone 
or something is designed, presented, depicted. 
Accordingly, the word 'informatio' means image, derivatively 
representation and concept - both meanings being iooted in the notion 
of forming, plus the more specialized meaning of explanation or inter- 
pretation. 
Besides, 'informare' can mean to educate or to instruct. This is 
why 'informatio' had the sense of instruction in medieval Latin. 
In ancient French, the word 'information' was used in -the singular 
Yune information', to mean both the process of collecting and ordering 
facts in an investigation, and the result, the legal document. All 
contemporary meanings of 'information' derive from the medieval and 
early French usages. 
In ordinary language 'information' means knowledge, details, 
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fnews', instruction. When in ordinary language it is said 'more infor- 
mation is needed', the idea is of something that can be accumulated 
and added. The idea underlying this quantitative mode of expression 
is made more precise in information theory. In everyday expressions 
information is always bound up with actual knowledge: 'to have 
information of something' and 'to receive information of someone'. 
Already in ordinary language, information is connected with a 
I human situation, with a communication situation. (Kirschenmann), 1970. 
Because a communication situation is most of the time a conscious 
human act, information is at least implicitly related to human conscious- 
ness. That partially explains why 'information' used in its ordinary 
sense is accompanied by elements of concreteness in the form of 
analogies to things. and actions, of relations to men with consciousness 
and the ability to know,, and of quantitative aspects. 
Communication between people happens for the most part with the 
help of speech and writing. It is an exchange of information. If we 
start with an analysis of what information is in human communication as 
a fundamental one, we can always understand those aspects of infor- 
mation not directly connected with natural language as special cases, 
or extrapolations of the relations ben,, een language and information. 
As Kirschenmann has pointed out: "Language can be considered as 
1) a psycho-physical activity which makes use of meaningful, arti- 
culated and graphically fixable acoustic signs, and 2) as a system of 
signs subjected to certain phonological, morphological, syntactic and 
lexical semantic activity. The essential characteristic of all 
linguistic phenomena is their sign-nature, i. e-. , meaningful structures 
signs which mean name or represent something irrespective of why the 
designation was undertaken. It is only because linguistic phenomena 
is 
represent something that they can carry out the varied functions of 
human communication. One can understand (the concept of) sign as a 
generic concept for-linguistic phenomena. 
The study and importance of (the concept of) sign has been 
emphasized by Nauta: . "The objective of a comparative study of Infor- 
mation in its full sense is not achievable without a thorough analysis 
of Semiotics (the general science of signs and of sign systems) in its 
modern coherence with System Theory and CybernetiCS (the science of 
control and of the organization of goal-directed behaviour)".. . "We will 
show that semiotics 12as a central place in the analysis and classifi- 
. 
cation of information phenomena. To put it in other terms: Semiotics 
is a kind of "physiology of info=ation processestf. The theoretical 
apparatus of semiotics will be shown to furnish the most important 
framework for the classification of information (and its complex of 
cognate notions) in all its diversity, and for the understanding of 
relevant phenomena". .. 
"But in ordertD equip semiotics adequately for 
its appointed task, we have (had) to modernize it by relating it with 
such congenial new disciplines as system theory and cybernetics", ('1970). 
SP7,1-TO= - According to Morris (1946) Semiotics is the study of a 
comprehensive doctrine of signs. Its main subdivision being semantics. 
syntactics and pragmatics. Peirce (1960) defined it as the 'formal 
doctrine of signs' which is identified with logic, in its general 
sense. (Peirce Vol 1,1960). 
We can con sider a sign as a sense-perceivable physical event, a 
material entity (sian vehicle) or a spatial temporal process 
(signal) 
. 
But for the event being a sign it has to f Ulf ill 570 further conditions: 
1) it is a sign only if it indicates, or stands for something else, 
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and 2) an event is a sign only in a sign situation or in a sign process 
(1) (Semiosis) The two above factors can contribute differently from 
case to case. 
In a semioties, pragmatically orientedA 
the sign situation includes three components: material events (sign 
vehicles) which play the role of the sign; in its function as a sign, 
the sign vehicle refers to something, the DEZý, IOTATUM; it also has a 
special EFFECT on the attitude of the inl--erpreter; this alteration 
is called the One can include as a fourth component - 
closely bound up with the third -. the interpreter himself. 
As a summary we can describe a sign situation, sign process or semi- 
osis (ZS) as a relation of several terms. Designating the event by 
"S", the DEVOT, 41TWI! with 'D' and -the interpreter with 'I', the semiosis 
or sign situation can be formulated as: 
ZS (ID, S) 
This relation is to be read as 'S stands for D to V. 
It is normally stressed that if one treats I as a black box (an open 
system) and S as its input, one has to be very careful and regard 
the effect of the interpreter as a change in the inner state of the 
system, involving an alteration of the pattern of future outputs of 
I. This idea of (open) system and inner states is tremendously 
important in Cybernetics (see Chapter IV, Section 3). 
ingle' signs are elements of a system of Most of, the time 's. L 
signs. Thus words are always components of a language. According 
to Morris (1960) we distinguish three dimensions of the sign: 
(1) The term semiosis was introduced by Morris to define a 
process in which something is a sign to some organism. 
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(1) The relations of signs to each other. This dimension is 
the syntactic one. 
(2) The relations between signs and what they stand for. This 
dimension is the semantic one. I 
(3) The relations between the signs and the users (interpreter 
and interpretant). This dimension is the pragmatic one. 
Of course, because of the very complex nature of sign situations, 
it is not always very easy to distinguish these relations in a a 
unique way. For example, if a sign designate another sign this relation 
is mainly semantic. Sometimes the semantic and pragmatic dimensions 
are hard to separate. 
We have been taking as a sign the wýhole make up of the sign vehicle 
and semiotic relations. But it is worth mentioning that some authors* 
holdthat only the designational role of an event should be called 'sign'. 
There are some peculiarities of signs which seem to justify this view: 
a) Signs are always phenomena of mediation: they always mediate 
what they stand for (nothing is a sign of or for itself) and most 
signs are also mediational events in the social 'Life of the users. 
b) It is not the whole sign vehicle but only certain aspects or 
structures of it which fulfill the sign role. For example, two 
identical signs can always (as physical entities) differ and yet can 
mean the same thing. 
c) All signs imply sign users to whom the signs stand for 
something and who carry out the abstractions. It is people, persons 
who decide that two different physical signs are to be seen as 
identical. 
If one neglects the details of the pragmatic dimension of the 
sign, one often tends to describe the relation between the sign and 
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that which it represents in an inaccurate way. For example it is 
commonly said: language is the 'carrier of meanings' or 'transmitter 
of information'. In such expressions, information or meaning is seen 
as something independent which is 'contained in' the linguistic sign, 
is 'transmitted' from place to place and 'received' by someone. But 
only the user and the perceptible sign vehicle are really autonomous 
and independent of a special role in a communication sign situation. 
It is only through the mental acts of the user ýhat the sign stands 
for something. The connection between meaning and 'carrier' results 
from their being associated with one another by the user. The 
illusion of 'carrying' and of 'transmitting' is based on the usually 
great determinancy of this association. 
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Information theory (or communication theory) is connected with 
the developments of telecommunication engineering in the first half of 
the present century. The semiotic origin of the modern information 
f the last century in concept can be traced back to the second half o. - 
the work of Pierce (Vol I, sections 537 and 539). Its main task is 
to make communication and signal processes available to structural 
and quantitative approaches where statistical vie-, Toints play an 
essential role. Hence, it deals with certain aspects of the linguistic 
and semiotic processes.. The quantitative treatment of Information, 
and of the diversity of current information concepts, 
is based on the 
ideas of the analysis of physical signals published by Hartley 
in 1928 
which in turn can be traced. back to a paper by 11-tyquist 
(1924). In 
dealing with communication processes using the mathematical theory of 
information, factors like value, utility, relevance, meaning, are 
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not examined. The term 'information theory' is deceptive if 'infor- 
mation' is taken in its ordinary sense. Basically, information theory 
is a general theory of signals and their transmission (Hartley). 
However, as Bar-Hillel (1964) has shown', the ambiguity of the word 
-information has daunted information theory from the start: 
[Hartley's amount of information of a signal sequence was 
meant to be just] a certain function of the relative 
frequency of this sequence amongst the set of all possible 
sequences of the same length... However it is psychologically 
almost im-possible not to make the shift irom the one sense 
of information, ... information = signal sequence to the 
other sense, information = what is expressed by the signal 
sequence ... Therefore, we see over and over again, that ... famount of information'. officially meanll-- to be a measure 
of the rarity of kinds of transmission of signal sequences, 
acquires also ... the connotation of a measure (of the 
rarity... ) of the kinds of facts ... designated by these 
signal sequences. And ... it turned out to be humanly impossible not to believe that one has got some hold of this 
important ... concept on the basis of such a simple procedure 
as say counting frequencies of letter occurrences in English 
(p 283). 
[Hartley] points out the important connection between this 
measure of information and certain processes of selection. 
The larger the set of signals from which the sender chooses 
[his message signals] ... the more complex the ... selection. 
At each selection there are eliminated all of the other 
symbols which might have been chosen... As the selection 
proceeds more and more pssible symbol sequences are eliminated 
and we say that the information becomes more precise. For 
example, in the sentence, 'apples are red'. the first word 
eliminates other kinds of fruit ... and all other objects 
in general ... the third eliminates other possible colours'. 
The fallacy is that the 'first word' eliminates other words (other 
signal sequences), even other words for apples, instead of eliminating 
other kinds of fruit or objects. 
The problems dealt with in information theory in the narrower 
sense relate to situations where communication processes take place. 
Besides of dealing with linguistic elements, information theory has 
to deal with communication devices which intervene between communication 
partners. 
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The process of communication can be broken doum into several 
operations: 
M: the production of an original message (Including all the 
conditions of production); E: the encoding of this message into a 
symbol sequence; S: the transformation of the symbol sequence into 
a signal; T: the transmission of the signal hrough a channel; 
S*: the reconversion of the signal into a symbol sequence; 
E'^: the decoding of the symbol sequence into the original message: 
an d R: the reception of the message (including the understanding of 
the message or the reaction to it. ) 
The whole communication process consists in the sequential 
carrying out of these operations, i. e., the tO-Lal operation 
'RE-S*TSEM'. (Any operation standing to the left affects the result L 
of the previous operation, standing to the right). In information 
theory the central position is the most important i. e. 'E*S*TSEI, 
Procedures that use abstract mathematical models for the communication 
process or its individual members belong to statistical information 
theory. 
It is a characteristic of statistical information theory that 
messages or their production are treated as random processes. The 
basic idea is that messages, in which the symbols follow each other 
in a familiar order provide no information. Information measures 
are defined on this basis. Hartley was the first to consider message 
transmission from a mathematical point of view. He conceived the 
message source as an emitter which equipped with a setM of n symbols 
succ essively selects symbol after symbol with identical probability. 
The result is a symbol sequence of a finite length of N symbols. He 
set himself the task of finding for such messages an -T, 
7,, 7FOF. ', -44T1ON C: ) 
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14EASURE which continuously grows with the number z of the symbol 
sequences and which is proportional to the length N of the message. 
He showed that these conditions are satisfied by 
N H0= log 
z= 
log 
nN 
log n 
The measure sought by Hartley is determined by the stated conditions 
only to a multiplicational constant K. Hence, one can write: 
H=K. log z. If one takes the logarithm to the base 2 it makes K 
One then obtains H= 1092z as information measure. This unit of 
information is defined as the amount of information of a selection of 
equally equiprobable alternatives and is called 'bit' , an abbreviation 
of 'binary digit'. 
The problem that Shannon set himself tD solve can be described in 
the following way: How can one encode or represent the messages of 
the source by means of electrical signals so that despite disturbances 
which can lead to transmission errors, one attains the fastest and 
surest transmission of them ? The solutions presupposes to find 
mathematical descriptions for the source, the channel, the signals, 
the disturbances in the channel, and the encoding operations, which 
can be related to one another. Shannon conceived the production of 
symbols as a stochastic process, i. e.. as a random pro 
I 
cess subject to 
certain laws of probability and to take the message source itself as 
an ergodi c source. An ergodic source is a special case of a stationary 
source. A stationary source produces symbol sequences with a constant 
frequency of each symbol in any subsequence, that is with constant 
time averages. A stationary source is called ergodic if every possible 
average of ensembles of symbol sequences produced by the source 
separately at different times (ensemble average), is equal to the 
corresponding time average. If one takes a message production as a 
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stochastic process, Hartley's ideas are generalized and is no longer 
assumed that the selection of the different symbols occurs with. the 
same probability. Mathematically to every symbol i of the set M of 
n symbols is assigned a production probability pi and these proba- 
bilities can be different from one another. 
A complete exposition of information theory is beyond the limits 
of this short sketch. There are many good books dealing with it 
(Shannon a-Lid IN'a-aver, 1962; Abramson, 1963). We can only aim to give 
a short account of the fundamentals of the theory: Let a situation S 
define a set M of n events (elemen ts of this set). For the set M 
let a measure P be so defined that every element i of M is assigned 
a real number pI between 0 and 1 as probability, where ýipi = 1. 
The following solutions are given in an interpretation of the 
mathematical formula: S is a message source. The production of a 
symbol i is an event; M is made up of the symbols contained in the 
inventory of the source; pi is the relative frequency with which 
symbol i will, over sufficiently long periods of production, be 
produced bythe source. The magnitude defined by formula II= -10 g2 pi 
is a logarithmic measure for the improbability of event i. The 
entropy, H(M) = -I'Pi 1092Pi9 is the mean value of the measure II 
weighted with the corresponding probabilities pi - of all events i 
of the set M, i. -e., a measure of M itself. 
[31 
From the beginning, the conceptual tool of Cybernetics has been 
used to elucidate some of the problems associated with organisms and 
the directedness of their behaviour., hence the introduction of the 
concept of negative feed-back i. e, 'the behaviour of [the organism] 
controlled by the margin of error at which the Eorganism] stands at 
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a given time with reference to a ... goal' (Rosenblueth Wiener and 
Bigelow, 1943). This concept (of feedback) was used by Wiener and 
his collaborators to 'introduce a weak concept of purposeful behaviour 
and a stronger one of teleological behaviour' (Bennett, 1976). Wiener's 
account of the former is: "the term purposeful is meant to denote that 
the act or behaviour may be interpreted as directed to the attainment 
of a goal - i. e., to a final condition in which the behaving object 
reaches. a definite correlation in time or in space with respect to 
another object or event" (p 18 loc. cited). Richard Taylor, (1950) 
has pointed out that this definition is so broad as to be vacuous. 
The aim is to account for the purposes of systems in terms of where 
'they end' rather than in terms of how they get there (Bennett). 
Weiner calls purpose behaviour teleological if it involves negative 
feedback. Negative feedback allows an agent to handle an environment 
which changes faster than the agent can act. But not all teleological 
behaviour requires the existence of feedback as Wiener himself admitý: 
"A snake may strike at a frog, or a frog at a fly, with no visual or 
other report from the prey after the movement has started. Indeed, 
the movement is in these cases so fast that it is not likely that 
nerve impulses would have time to ... modify the movement effectively". 
Nor is any system with feedback a teleological one. Compare the many 
and sophisticated feedback existent in a radio device for example. 
It seýms that what is needed is to clear up the notion of 
teleology and then see if it helps to understand and explain the 
directedness of organisms. One of the recent attempts to deal with 
this problem is the one initiated by Sommerhoff (19.50). Nagel's theory 
of directive organisation was based on it. Somm-erhoff uses 
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the notion of 'directive correlation' to explain aiming goal directed 
behaviour (Woodfield, 1976). The exposition of teleological behaviour 
given by Charles Taylor in the Explanation of Behaviour (1964) is a 
direct descendent of Sommerhoff's view. An exposition and critique of 
both theories can be found in Woodfield (1976). 
Perhaps as a first approximation to the elucidation of teleology 
we ought to consider the logical structures involved in teleological 
I 
explanations(') v Most. people would take the idea of natural science, 
_, 
as mainly and only deductive as a very sound one. Natural science 
being organized in Euclid-like deductive systems. But the feature of 
reasonings that relate to efficient causality is different: "In 
geometrical reasoning if from a figure's having characteristics 
P, Q, R it follows that the figure has characteristic S, then no 
added characteristics of the figure can defeat this conclusion. But 
if from the action of causer X, Y, Z there would follow an effect El. 
the following may be nullified if the further causal factor W is 
present". (Geach). 
In order to account for efficient causality notions like prevention 
and interference has to be brought in. That is why it is not possible 
to assimilate the following of effect upon cause to entailment. The 
notions of interference and prevention allows to look at causal laws 
as stating what happens if nothing interferes and not what de facto 
always happens. But if this is the case, the notion of tendency - 
'how things go on in the world" - is important in any account of 
efficient causality., and tendency is a teleological notion. If we 
try to describe the characteristic behaviour of an aaent in a coherent 0 
(1) 1 have been influenced. by Les Johnson in my view about this 
subject. He has drawn my attention to the works of Kenny (1966) and 
Geach (1972,1975). 
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way, the only -possibility open to us is to describe it as acting in 
order that so-and-so happens. 
When we consider sentences we distinguish, following Frege, 
between sense and reference. With no change in reference, sense is 
the heart of the matter when we are concerned with knowledge, opinion 
or, suppos-ition. But the achievement of a state of affairs is 
independent of the mode of presentation. Because of the relative 
indifference to sense we may expect this indiLference to be complete 
in pure teleological statement. The logical form of a teleological 
statement might read 'p in order that q' with 'p' and 'q' to 
represent prepositions. As Geach (1975) maintains 'p in order that 
q' is not a truth-functional compound of 'p' and 'q' and what is 
present here is a kind of limited extensionality. The logical role 
of 'q' is analogous (connected with) the role of 'q' in 'a brings 
it about that q'. 
Taken teleology, final causation, seriously means that 'p in 
order that q' must not be reducible to the form 'p because a desired, 
intended, wanted that qfi This last form is rather a special sort 
of efficient cause not a special sort of causation. The systemati- 
zation of teleological thinking is linked to the pattern of human 
practical reasoning; in its skeleton that is, (Geach, 1975). The 
limited extensionality of teleological propositions comes about from 
the connection between teleological reasoning and practical reasoning, 
reasoning with directives (fiats) as premises and conclusion. 
There is an important distinction between standard logic and 
practical reasoning: the conclusion can be DEFEATED by the addition 
of new premises. In standard logicthe addition of a premise cannot 
invalidate a previously valid inference: if a conclusion is drawn 
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from a set of premises, then it is validly drawn from any set of 
premises containing those premises. That is not the case in practical 
reasoning unless the premises setting out a goal are not only correct 
but COMPL But only in restricted context can we approach complete- 
ness, if any. This sort of reasoning needs the support of something 
like decision theory (Johnson, 1978): "IThere an agent's goals are 
consistently realizable, then consideration of the advantages and 
disadvantages of particular actions can be seen as the search for 
conclusion fiats derivable from the goal fiats which incorporate all 
events which provide the standards of advantage and disadvantage for 
the case in point. But, there is no guarantee thAt the ends are 
capable of joint attainment, and thus we need something like decision 
theory". 
In teleological explanations we are concerned about what tendencies 
will exist when certain agents operate; what actually happens is the 
resultant of the operating tendencies. We need in this realm the 
same skill needed to solve conflict of goals. W'e cannot avoid teleo- 
logical thinking and we need to be more conscious when we 
are engaged in it. 0 
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I qHAPTER III 
CONS C IOUSNE S-S 
Ell 
Since the appearance of Gilbert Ryle's book 'The Concept of Mind, 
an attempt to zinalyse the meaning'of coniciousness as it is ordinarilly 
used would have to face the objection of Ryle who argues, that the 
word is ordinarily used in a number of different contexts for a variety 
of purposes. In Chapter VI (Self-knowledge) of the mentioned book, 
Ryle analyses different uses- of the word 'conscious' in real life. It 
is perhaps useful to quote him at large: 
"a) People often speak in this way; they say 'I was conscious 
that the furniture had been rearranged', or 'I was conscious that he 
was less friendly than usual'. In such contexts the word 'conscious' 
f is used'instead of words like 'found out'.. ' realised' and 'discovered' 
to indicate a certain noteworthy nebulousness and consequent inartic- 
ulateness of the apprehension.... 
"b) People often use 'conscious' and 'self-conscious' in 
describing the embarrassment exhibited by persons, specially youthful 
persons, who are anxious about the opinions held by others of their 
qualities of character or intellect.... 
11c) 'Self-conscious' is sometimes used in a more general sense 
to indicate that someone has reached the stage of paying heed to his 
own qualities of character or intellect, irrespective of whether or. 
not' he is embarrassed about other people's estimation of them.... 
"d) Quite different from the foregoing uses of 'conscious', 
Iself-conscioust and 'unconscious', is the use in which a numbed or 
anaesthetize'd person is said to have lost consciousness from his 
feet up to his knees. In this use 'conscious' means sensitive or 
sentient and 'unconscious' means anaesthetized or insensitive. We 
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say that a person has lost consciousness when Ine has ceased to be 
sensitive to any slaps, noises, pricks or smells. 
"e) Different from, though closely connected with this last 
use, there is the sense in which a person can be said to be unconscious 
of a sensation, when he pays no heed to it. A walker engaged in a 
heated dispute may be unconscious, in this sense, of the sensation of 
his blistered heel, and the reader of these words was, when he began 
this sentence, probably unconscious of the muscular and skin sensation 
in the back of'his neck or in his left knee. A person may also be 
. unc. onscious or unaware that he 
is frowning, beating time to the music, 
or muttering. 
"Conscious in this sense, means 'heeding' and it makes sense to 
say that a sensation is hardly noticed, even wrien the victim's 
attention is ýixed very strongly on something else 
The use of the word 'conscious' in all the previous senses is not 
the matter of discussion. It seems more Jimportant to see if any of the 
senses can be taken as basic, the other being derived or def ined in 
terms of the basic sense. Ryle seems to assume that these several uses 
are all on a par with one another - none being -,. nore basic than any of 
the others. 
Another important analysis of the term 'conscious' was made by 
John Wisdom (1963/1934) and because of. its importance we will- quote 
it at large too: 
"I cannot analyse what I mean by 'conscious', but I want to make 
known to you what I attribute to a thing when I call it 
'conscious'. 
When using the word in this special sense, I will write 
it CONSCIOUS, 
and I will now set down the clues to what I mean by conscious. 
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"M COESCIOUS implies either feels or is aware 
(ii) Consider'the change which comes over a man as he comes 
round from cholorpform or from dreamless sleep. You "Know quite well 
the change I mean. That kind of change I call 'becoming CONSCIOUS'. 
Of course, as you come round from chloroform, all sorts of bodily 
changes are taking place - the nerves are recovering from the chemical 
poison; and as you come round from sleep, more blood flows to the- 
brain. So that, strictly, there is nothing that can be called 'the 
change' which takes place when one comes round from chloroform and 
sleep. Nevertheless, these bodily changes are not ones you thought 
of when I spoke of the change; you never thought of blood and brain; 
That kind of change which you immediately thought of when I spoke of 
the change from sleep or chloroform, is the one I express by 
'becoming CONSCITOUS'. 
CONSCIOUS does not mean alive. A tree is alive but not 
r-o scious. An amoeba is certainly alive, yet quite likely not conscious. 
"(iv) CONSCIOUS does not mean living and sensitive. A man in a 
dreamless sleep is a living and sensitive being; but he is not at that 
time conscious in my sense, i. e., CONSC-TOUS-. Of course, -such a man is 
conscious compared with a tree or a dead man; more accurately, there 
is a sense of 'conscious' in which it is correCL. to say that he is a 
conscious being. He is conscious in the derived and hypothetical sense 
that, if he were shaken, he would become CONSCITOUS (fundamental sense). 
"This hypothetical sense of 'conscious'. is less fundamental than 
that in terms of which mental facts are to be defined that is CONSC-TOT, 1S. 
For 'conscious' ýin this hypothetical sense) has a meaning derived from, 
i. e., defined in terms of CONSCITOUS. In other words, 
if we split up 
the meaning of the hypothetical sense, we find that one of 
its elements 
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is CONSCIOUS..... .. I 
(v) S is CONSCIOUS, implies neither (1) that S is conscious of 
his environment nor (2) that S is conscious of himself. As to (1) a 
man is conscious when he i-s dreaming... and therefore when unconscious 
of his environment. I do not deny, on the-contrary, I assert, that 
there is a usual and therefore perfectly respectable sense in which 
fconscious' is used, which does imply 'conscious of hi-s environment'. 
Thus when we say 'Is he conscious? ' meaning 'Has he- regained 
consciousness? ' (after an accident) we do mean 'Is he now again conscious 
of his environment? ' But it will be seen that this third way of using 
? conscious' is yet another sense derived from our first, that is.,, the 
sense we write CCONS=US (sense 3) means 'conscious of environment'. 
"As to (2) ,a man may be conscious and yet unconscious of himself -.. 
It is important to add clause (2) because some psychologists use 
I 
rconscious' in a sense which implies consciousness of self. Thus they 
would deny that animals are conscious, because, although they would' 
admit that dogs smell bones and are therefore CONSCIOUS, they would 
deny that a dog ever thinks to himself, 'I shall do so and so, e. g., 
'take a bone'. In other words, they deny that an animal is ever 
consc ious; of itself and they express their view very misleadingly by 
saying that animals are not conscious. This fourth sense. of 
'conscious' 
is obviously also derived from CONSCIOUS. So we m4y write: 
"(vi) CONSCIOUS is the fundamental sense of 'conscious' - that is 
the sense in terms of which all other senses are defined. 
" 
We mu'st notice that Ryle's list of the possible usages of the 
word 'conscious' in ordinary language, 
is a different type of list 
from Wisdom, who reveals a number of possible philosophical distinc- 
tions if we take 'conscious' in various senses. On the other 
hand, 
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Wisdom analysis allow to correct the ambiguities in Ryle's description 
of sense (d) (self conscious' and 'unconscious'). 
WIsdom believes that a fundamental sense of 'conscious' may be 
distinguished. 
. 
Besides he asserts that the other senses of consciousness 
can be defined in terms of the fundamental sense. We must, along witt-h 
Evans, assert that the other senses entails the basic sense, but thev 
are not entailed by it. 
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We must work along some line to see if we can find a workable 
definition of consciousness. First we must remember that the denial 
of consciousness (Hamilton) or its 'reduction" (1-Ryle, White) for others 
more appropriate terms, should not be looked upon as denying the 
'existence' of consciousness, but rather some particular theories put 
forward for it. 
In a passage of one of his books, James If-ill when talking about 
consciousness, says: 
"It is easy to see what is the nature of the terms conscious and 
consciousness, and what is the marking functic--i which they are 
destined to perform. It was of great importance for the purpose of 
naming, that we should not only have names to distinguish the different 
classes of our feelings, but also a name applicable equally to all 
those classes. This purpose is answered by t.. e concrete term conscious; 
and the abstract of it consciousness. Thus, iff we are in a way sentient; 
that is, have any of the feelings whatsoever of- a living creature; the 
word conscious is applicable to the feeler, and consciousness to the 
feeling; that is to say, the words are generical marks, under which all 
the names of the subordinate classes of the feelings of a sentient 
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creature are included. When I smell a rose, I am conscious3 wh en I 
have the idea of fire, I am conscious, when I remember, I am conscious, 
when I reason, and when I believe, I am conscious; but believing and 
being conscious of belief, are not two things, they are just the same 
thing I can name at one time without the aid of the generical mark, 
while at another time it suits me to employ the generical mark". 
I hasten to say that the faulty example at the end of the passage 
is due to the lack of distinction between dispositional and episodic 
senses of mental states. 
Mill's definition of consciousness is in terms of the experiences 
of seeing, hearing, feeling, thinking, imagining, etc,. The relation 
between consciousness and the variety of conscious phenomena can be 
explicated in terms of a technical term used for Ryle - polymorphous 
concept. Accordingly, consciousness is a polymorphous concept. 
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White, (1964,1967) following Ryle (1951) distinguishes between 
a specific concept, such as singing, presenting arms, or counting, 
and a polymorphous concept, such as working, practicing, or obeying. 
concept X is polymorphous - that is, one that takes many forms - 
if there -are many dif f erent things one or another of which can, 
in 
certain circumstances., count as X., and yet none of which activities 
in other circumstances count as X. It is the second of these two 
conditions that distinguishes a polymorphous concept such as 
obedience, from a generic concept, such as perception.. . 
"Any word 
that expresses a polymorphous concept does not name some specific 
thing; it indicates the relationship of that thing to its circum- 
stances, and thereby signifies what, on this occasion, 
it is a form 
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o 11A very simple example of a polymorphous concept is the concept 
of repetition. What makes anything a repetition cannot be any feature 
that is peculiar to the specific thing done.. For, first, anything 
whatsoever, if it is done for the second time, is a repetition, and 
nothing whatsoever, if it is done for the first time, is a repetition. 
Secondly, whatever counts-as a repetition of X cannot itself differ 
from X., What makes 'repetition' a true description of anything is 
the circumstances in which it is done - namely, that it has been done 
before". 
To give an explanation of 
'a 
term using 'verbal' definitons is 
quite common if we can produce some good examp'lles where the term 
plainly applies. Plato represents Socrates as objecting to this 
procedure: unless we already know quite well ;, -, hat the term means, 
there will be no unexceptionable examples to show us; so examples 
are useless anyhow. The truth is that if misunderstanding arises it 
may be resolved either by producing criteria -for using a term,, or 
by giving good clear examples: we can work from examples, to get 
criteria that will fit them,, and we can use criteria to apply the 
term to new examples. In any case, the terms used in the definitions 
consist of terms already understood by the hearer. This 'verbal' 
definition can only'be given to practiced language-users. (cf. 
R. Robinson's book Definition O. U. P. 1-0,72). Thus following Mill, 
we can say that to be conscious is to perceive, to feel emotions and 
sensations, to have images and recollections, and to have desires, 
intentions and thoughts. 
As we are using consciousness -a polymorphous concept - of 
several instances of our experience, we are dispensed of thinking 
that there are something more to consciousness that our actual 
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occurrences. But there is the temptation to think of consciousness 
as the sum of determined experiences at any moment consciousness 
conceived as a mosaic of particular experiences, as it were. If we 
go along and equate consciousness with the name of a class of mental 
'events' 
. then it must be possible to define the class extensionally 
by denoting all the members belonging to it. This view of conscious- 
ness is the classical atomistic view of consciousness. We must 
maintain the distinction between objects as a class and concepts 
(see Geach, 1-0.72). 
It is - dif f icult to f ind a topic-neutral word to ref er to the 
experiences of which consciousness is comprised. Evans uses the 
X 
expression 'element(s) of consciousness - 'elements' JEor short -' 
but even this term suggests a certain atomistic independence of one 
element from the next. Besides the need to refer to the 'elements' 
of consciousness it is also necessary to refer to their temporal 
rela. tions to one another. This twofold manifestation of conscious-, 
ness has been termed different by different author S. Grice (1941) 
has referred to the contemporaneous elements as a 'total temporary 
state' of consciousness. A continuous succession of elements, 
Grice refers to as a series of total temporary states. Grice defines 
a total temporary state as follows: I 
"A total temporary state is composed of all the experiences any 
one person is having at any given time. Thus if I am now thinking of 
Hitler and ffeeling a pain, and having no other experiences, there 
will be occurring now a total temporary state contining as elements 
a thought of Hitler and a feeling of pain. Now since total temporary 
states may be said to occur at various times, they may 
be said to 
form temporal series". 
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The above account allows for a total temporary state the possi- 
bility of containing but a single element, but that is left open as 
a theoretical possibility. The normal state of affairs is one in 
which total temporary states have a plurality of elements. It is 
indisputable to state the plurality of elements in a temporal state. 
In one sen-se, the efforts in artificial intelligence and related 
subjects of explaining'and realising parallel and concurrent processes 
is but one of the expressions of this assumption. In everyday life 
we continue to have visual impressions when -ý%Te, hear 4 sound or when 
we have thought-s, or tactile sensations and so on. But even granting 
that a total temporary state contains a plurality of elements there 
remains the possibility of a series of identical total temporary 
states. In this case it would be perfectly normal to talk of a 
perfectly static consciousness in which no existing element dies out 
and no new element appears. 
But the series of total temporary states are, normally, a series 
of changing elements where some elements 'will persist' from one 
state to the next, others will be new. The thesis that the series of 
total temporary states - consciousness - are dependent on change is 
nop new, btLt it has been neglected one and again in the history of 
the subject. Ribot expresses it in" the following way: 
"All our organs of perception are at the same time sensorial and 
motor. To perceive with our eyes, ears, hands, feet, tongue, nostrils, 
movements are needed. The more mobile the parts of our 
body, the 
more exquisite is their sensibility, the less perfect their mobile 
powers, the more obtuse their sensibility. Nor 
is this all; without 
motor elements, perception is impossible. We will call 
to mind a 
previous statement that if the'eye be kept 
fixed upon a given object 
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without moving, perception after a while grows dim, and then disappears. 
Rest the tips of the fingers upon a table vithout pressing, and the 
contact at the end of a. few minutes will no longer be felt. But a 
motion of the eye or of the finger, be it even so light, will re-arouse 
perception. Consciousness is only possible through change; change is 
not possible save through movement. It would be easy to expatriate at 
great length upon this subject, for although the facts are very manifest 
and of common experience, psychology has nevertheless so neglected the 
role sustained by movements, that it actually forgot at last that they 
are the fundamental conditions of cognition in that they are the instru- 
ment of the fundamental law of consciousness, which is relativity, 
change. Enough has now been said to warrant the unconditional state- 
ment, that where there is no movement there is no perception. " 
More recently Kenny (1963) has expressed similar view: "On the 
other hand!, not every part of the body which is necessary for a partic- 
ular mode of perception is an organ of perception. Damage to the visual 
area of the cortex will make a man blind; for all that, the cortex is 
not an organ of sight as the eye is. What then is an organ of perception ? 
The concept is not entirely precise; but it seems that we shall not be 
f ar wrong if we say that an organ of perception is a part of the body which 
can be moved at will in ways which affect the efficiency of the sense in 
question. Thus, part of what is involved in the concept of sense-organ 
is expressed in such remarks as: 'you can see it if you look through 
this crack'. 'You can hear them if you put your ear to the wall'. 
'If 
you don't like the smell, then hold your nose'. 
The movement claimed to be necessa ry to consciousness cannot be 
understood as a simple physical movement. It must 
be looked upon as 
an aspect of action - of what the organism 
does. Our movements in this 
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sense, necessarily enter into descriptions of u-Iiat we are doing. The 
sense organs must be *identified in relation to their functions. It 
must be understood as that with which certain sorts of activity can 
be performed. Thus having a particular sense or3an necessarily 
enters into a full description of a certain sort of doing. By relating 
consciousness to what we do - to our sense-organ activities - we can 
offer an explanation of the Kantian point that consciousness exhibits 
. temporal succession. Our doings take time and 
involve a sequence of 
changes themselves, and in being 'aware of what we are doing, we are 
aware of some of these temporal changes. In this way, consciousness 
reflects temporal change. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ACTIVITY 
Ell 
The account of what is traditionally referred to as our 'appre- 
hensiou of the external world' uses the key notion of CONSCIOUSNESS 
which is the basic concept in all the traditional theories of mind. 
In his book 'The Concept of Mind' (1949) Ryle has attempted to show 
that 'heed' is the basic concept for the above account. In the same 
vein White (1964) has given support to the Ryle thesis. 
It is because of the historical and conceptual links between 
attention and consciousness that we ought to start with a character- 
ization of consciousness, i. e., the way we look and regard the pheno- 
menon of consciousness. This short account will clear the path to a 
further consideration of attention and how the historical and concep- 
tual link is going to be considered. 
We must remember that in analysing the world, man has seen himself 
in a special status in the world. Man is distinct from the world around 
him. But that distinctive characteristic has been regarded differently 
by various thinkers. 
Some have seen the difference as a static difference i. e., as a 
difference in the kind of elements man is composed of, and the kind of 
state it I could be in at any particular time. Others have regarded the 
differences as a dynamic one i. e., as a difference in the laws which 
govern the alterations and their interactions with other things. 
Contemporaneously we can discern two main views. Each view sees 
the difference not as a difference of degree of complexity of organi 
sation but as a difference in kind. One view considers that what marks 
off man from the inanimate objects around 
him is a matter of the 
elements of which he is composed2 or the states which 
he can instantiate. 
Besides body and its different physical states man has a mind, or at 
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least mental states. This view is historically associated with 
Descartes and is termed the Cartesian view. The main assertion is 
that mental is not a form of the physical and is not reducible to the 
physical. 
The other view gives an account of the differences between man 
and the world around him in terms of the 1AWs which govern his 
behaviour and his interactions with other things. Man's distinctness 
is emphasized from a dynamic point of view, because his behaviour and 
reactions are governed by different principles and to be understood 
in different terms. 
These two views of the special nature of ran are not held together, 
although they are not inconsistent. It can be looked upon as a-way of 
asserting that one of the determinants (material stuff or dynamic law) 
is not only necessary but sufficient (see above). We have already 
emphasized that in everyday concepts we cannot make a tidy ruling 
about the relative contribution of factors linked together in our 
common concepts. We assert -that depending on the context we give more 
weight to one or another factor. In fact, in explaining the nature 
of man we must evaluate in each branch of enquiry: biology, sociology, 
etc., the relative importance of those factors. 
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We think that a better way of approaching the problem is through 
the useful notion of activity which allows us to explain the 
behaviour 
of the subject and his mental state at the same 
time. We regard 
activity as a process of INTERTRAFFIC 
between opposite poles, subject 
and object, and the one 
in which the transition or TRANSLATION of the 
object into a subjective 
image takes place. At the same time it is 
also in activity that the transition 
is achieved from the subjective 
image into activi 
. 
ty's objective results (see above). 
The life of a subject is made up of a system of successive 
activities. Activity is a non-additive unit of the corporeal, material 
life of the individual. In the narrower sense i. e., on the psycho- 
logical plane, it is a unit of life, mediated by an _TMAGE whose real 
function is to orientate the subject in the world. 
The word 'activity' is a very general word used to describe all 
sorts of goings on. This would lead one to expect that it did not 
possess a very strict logic of its own. However, activity in the. 
generic sense of describing very specific kinds of change which cannot 
be described as precisely by means of any other concept, has been the 
concern of some thinkers (cf. Kenny, 1963; von Wright, 1963). The 
search is for a sense of the word 'activity' in which it is not implied 
that an activity is composed of a number of 'doings' that are not 
themselves activities. A definite distinction must be made between an 
activity and an action such that it, is not the case that an activity 
consists of a succession of acts. 
Sometimes 'activity' is used in a sense in which it has 'goings on, 
and 'doings' as instantiations which are not themselves activities. 
One example of this position is found in D. S. Shwayder, The Stratification 
of Behaviour (1, ondon 1965) "The activities of life are distinguished 
from acts 
-1 
one might do., possible when engaged in those activities. The 
background field of activity engaged in often provides the setting 
against which we may fix units of action. Also, we may begin to analyse 
a field of activity by-specifying kinds of, action necessarily or 
characteristically done when engaged 
in that activity". We are ruling 
out this sense of the word activity and are more concerned with 
activity in the generic sense depicted previously, 
i. e., a system of 
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activities. 
We must draw a distinction already made by von Wright between the 
result of an action and the consequence of an act. The purpose oj- 
this distinction is to bring out two totally different ways in which 
an act may be connected with the changes affected by it. When the 
conneztion between the act and the change is, intrinsic or logical, 
von Wright calls the change the 'RESULT' of the act. When the 
connection is extrinsic (von Wright regards this extrinsic relation as 
primarily a causal one), the change is the 'CONSEQUENCE' of the act. 
For example, if the act is an act of opening the window, it is 
logically necessary for the window to be opening. 'The fact of the 
window opening is the result of the act. On the other hand, if the 
opening of the window caused the door to slam, the slamming of the 
door would be a consequence of the act of opening the window and not 
the result of an act.. 
von Wright gives two possible interpretations that may be giverf 
to the use of 'result': either the change corresponding to this act 
or, -the end state of this change. Thus, by the result of the act of 
opening a window we can understand, the fact that the window is 
opening (changes from closed to open) or the fact that it is open. 
This distinction has been labelled by C. O. Evans as RESULTc the 
change corresponding to the act and as RESULTe the end state of the 
change. Two possibilities present themselves: the agent may either 
bring about result c or resulte. 
An activity may be identified in terms of these possibilities 
(Evans). An agent or subject is engaged in an activity (in the basic 
or generic sense) when he brings about a RESULTc and he does not 
stop as soon as resultc comes about. An agent or subject is engaged 
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in a performance when he brings about a RESULT e and 
it takes time for 
result, to be produced. 
In this way the contrast between an activity and a performance 
can be put: the result in an activity holds at all times from beginning 
to end; in the case of a performance the result is only fully realized 
at the te-rmination of the pefformance. 
Kenny (1963) gives. logico-graumatical criteria to distinguish 
between activities and performances.. If the verb describing the activity 
or performance is represented by 'has ýed' then the distinction is 
possible as follows: in the case of an activity 'A is ýing' entails 
'A has ýed', in the case of a performance 'A is 6ing' entails 'A has 
not ýed'. Performances are completed; activities just stop. Perfor- 
mances take time, while activities go on for a time. 
Another important distifiotion to be drawn is between an activity 
and a state. An activity is a sort of doing of an agent; a state is 
not a sort of doing at all. We talk of the state of a subject or t1iing 
or conversely, of a person or thing being in a certain state. A person 
is in a state when he is undergoing something or something is happening 
to him; and 'undergoings' and 'happenings' are not 'doings'. It must 
be granted that a person may be able to induce a state, or put himself 
in a state, but this only means that he is able to bring about the 
conditions that give rise to the state; it does not mean that he brings 
about the state itself. 
We must recognize non-dispositional as well as dispositional states. 
In the case of a dispositional state a person may be said to be in a 
state under conditions in which he is undergoing nothing in connection 
with it at the time. In contrast there are occurrent states which a 
subject can only be said to be, in when he is actually undergoing a 
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certain experience at the time. 
The concept of state also implies the idea of its persistence 
through time. States last for a time. Activities and states have. in 
common that they are both continuous through ti=e, but activities may 
be said to go on for a time, whereas states last for a time. It is 
possible to distinguish a thing's state from its circumstance. A 
state is always a state relative to some prior classification of the 
thing under consideration. In relation to that classification the 
state is an accidental or changeable feature off the object. 
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We have been considering activity as a very important notion in 
the explanation and understanding of the life of a subject and we have- 
emphasized the fact that the life of an individual is made up of a 
system of successive activities (the elements of that succession are 
themselves activities). The important thing to notice is the emphasis 
of the concept SYSTEM because it brings to light the whole tool and 
methodological considerations of General Systems Theory (G. S. T. ) In 
the same way by remarking the notion of activity as an INTERTRAFF-TC 
between subject and object we bring to light the whole consideration of 
cybernetics and particularly the notions of information and control. 
The methodological principles for the study of systems originally 
evolved within the framework of 'organismic' ideas in biology. In the 
late 1920's von Bertalanffy w-rote: "Since the fundamental of the 
living thing is its organization, the custoT. -iary investigation of the 
single parts and processes cannot provide a complete explanation of 
the vital phenomena. This investigation gives us no information about 
the co-ordination of parts and processes. Thus the chief task of 
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biology must be to discover the laws of biological systems (at all 
levels or organization). We believe that the attempts to find a 
foundation for theoretical biology point at a fundamental change in 
the world picture. This view considered as a method of investigation, 
we shall call "organismic biology" and., as an attempt at an explanation, 
"the system theory of the organism" (in von Bertalanffy 1972, pp 24-25, 
Chapter 1 of Klir, G. J. 1972). The organismic program was the germ 
of what later became known as general system theory. The replacement 
of the term 'organism' by other 'organized entities' such as social 
groups, personality, technological devices led to scientific approach, 
of, ten refer-red to as the systems approach. A lot of evidence (Klir, 
1969,1972) has been found which suggests that certain, properties of 
systems do not depend on the specific nature of the individual system; 
that is, they are valid for systems of different nature (physical, 
biological or social). Some of these properties were first understood 
as simple system similarities. The view of Bertalanffy of regarding 
Obiological) organism as open systems in contrast with 'closed systems' 
studied by classical thermodynamics led some authors (Prigogine, 1955) 
to develop a rigorous formal theory of those open systems in terms of 
statistical thermodynamics. 
In statistical thermodynamics a-closed SYSL-em are those systems 
which do not exchange matter with the environment and which involve 
reversible processes. Closed thermodynamic systems left to themselves 
approach a state of equilibrium characterized by minimum free energy 
and maximum entropy (disorder or randomness). Open systems are systems 
open to the environment in terms of interchange of matter and energy. 
They have no minimum free energy or maximum entropy. The system remains 
in a steady state under conditions of input of energy for the work in 
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the maintenance of organization. Thus General System Theory (G. S. T. ) 
used the concept of open systems to express a new world outlook (cf. 
Bertalanffy, 1968). The new outlook rejected the reduction of all 
phenomena to the physical and replaced it with a concept of various 
fspheres of reality' interconnected but relatively independent. Hence, 
the possibility of founding a unified science on the basis of laws 
applicable to each level or sphere. In. fact, the theory of open 
systems (along with control theory and feedback models)is the part of 
General Systems Theory most widely applied in playsical chemistry, bio- 
physics, simulation of biological processes, physiology, pharmaco- 
dynamics and so forth (Bertalanffy, 1968). 
From the viewpoint of the interaction ýetween systems and their 
environment absolutely closed, relatively closed, and open systems 
are sometimes categorized (Klir, 1969 p 70). A relatively closed 
, system 
is a sysýem where the paths of interaction between the system 
and its environment are accurately defined; 'system' and 'environment' 
being understood as def ined on some level of reality. An open system 
is called an object in Klir's terminology. An object is never completely 
isolated from its environment. In terms of the system this results in 
the fact that the behaviour of the system need not be (and as a rule, 
is not) determined exclusively by some internal properties of the object, 
but may be influenced by something in the environment of the object as 
well. Different classification of systems according to the viewpoint 
adopted are summarized in Klir (1969). 
We have been talking about activity in the generic sense. In 
reality, however, we have to deal with concrete, specific activies, 
each of which is oriented, i. e., the activity has a directedness, an 
end. The main thing that distinguishes one activity from another lies 0 
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in the difference in their directedness. It is this directedness 
which gives to the activity certain orientation. 
To give an account of some phenomena 'in terms of ends' is to give 
a 'teleological explanation. But if we ask ourselves: what are ends ? 
we may go stray on the wrong tack. As Geach (1975) has expressed: "By 
a sort of linguistic original sin, human beings engaged in abstract 
thought have. a tendency to turn constructions of a non-nominal kind, 
p. redicative phrases for example or again sub-clauses of a sentence, 
into noun-phrases; aqid then, if we are, philosophers, we may ask what 
o. bjer-ts these noun-like or name-like constructions (Kotarbinsky has 
called them 'onomatoids') correspond to in rebus". 
If we use the word 'object' to refer to the directedness of mental 
states we must concede we are stretching the word object beyond its 
everyday meaning which refers to items in the world. Some mental states, 
thinking for example, has a directedness, but the 'object' of thought 
may not exist at all. ' We want to restrict the range of application of 
object' to items in the world. What account can we make about some 
mental states like malfounded emotions based on a mistaken existential 
belief, emotions like fear that something is the case, beliefs and 
dispositions which'even when not having an 'object' in the above sense 
still have some directedness ? Some theorists have used the notion of 
intentionality to talk about the various types of mental states and 
dispositions and have explained this notion by the use of the object 
terminology. Following Wilson (1972) we must offer an alternative 
account. 
Intuitively it is accepted that beliefs, desires, many emotions, 
intentions have something in common which they share with other mental 
states. The most usual explanation is to refer to the fact that a 
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belief must be a belief that something is the case, a desire must be 
a desire to do something, anger must be anger with someone, to pay 
attention is to pay attentioný to something and so on. In Geach (1975) 
own words: 'Ends includes at least the things we want'. But in order 
to give a more systematic explanation of these various states we need 
to explore better the issues at stake. It is desirable to resist the 
temptation of explaining intentionality of mental states in terms of 
the language we use to describe them or to refer to certain logical 
feature all those statements have in common. It is mental states like 
beliefs, desires, etc., which are intentional and we must give sub- 
stantive account of these issues. 
Some writers have used the term 'content' instead of 'object' to 
explain-intentionality. So Brentano in the passage already quoted 
talks of REFERENCE TO A CONTENT. But if we say that some mental states 
are characterized by reference to a content, we seem to be suggesting 
that a relation of some kind is involved. It seems better to say that 
some mental states have content., or are contentful. 
We mention before that when we ascribe a state to a thing, we 
always have in mind a prior classification of the thing. ' Now there 
are different ways in which particular items can be grouped or classi- 
fied. We *can classify the items by the possession of similar qualities. 
For example, thoughts can b oD, rouped together on the 
basis of intro- 
pectible or observable qualities, according to what occurs in each case 
is qualitatively similar or different. Another ground for making. 
classifications of items is in terms of relations, for example in terms 
of 'spatial and temporal relations of one- item to another. But some 
classification of mental states are neither qualitative nor relational. 
When we say about a number of persons that they are paying attention 
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the basis of classification is neither qualitative nor relational if 
the paying attention at reference is a thought about something. 
Different people can be paying attention even when their attitude or 
behaviour are not at all qualitatively alike. What goes on in each 
case is not at all the same. So there is a way of classifying mental 
states together which is not straightforwardly qualitative or relational 
and those mental states can b_e grouped together with other mental states 
in such a way. Following Wilson we think that this is part of the force 
of saying that mental states have content. If the beliefs of two people 
are. grouped together as instances of the same belief-type, this is not 0 
by virtue of the introspectible or observable similarity of their present 
states,, nor is it by virtu e of the qualitatively-similarity of the 
behaviour which manifests their belief. Nor is the basis of the class 'i- 
fication relational. 
Other mental states, acts, dispositions, capacities that are inten- 
tional - judgements, doubts, decisions, wishes, etc., - share this 
feature, that they can be classified and compared to states, acts, etc., 
of the same kind on a basis which is neither qualitative nor relational. 
Some human activities fall into classes with a similarly non-qualitative, 
non-relational basis. We can group together human activities by reference 
for example, to the intention with which they are performed. Thus a few 
people can be said to be doing the same thing, like preparing for rain, 
even though their actions are not qualitatively similar. 
Not all mental states fall into classes with -a non-qualitative, 
non-relational basis. Sensations is one case at point. Pain being 
suffered by different people can be compared and classified according 
to intensity or any other characterization we choose. It may also be 
compared and classified in relational terms, for example, 
in terms of 
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its cause. Sensory states, on the other hand,, can be classified in 
the appropriate way. If it is asked what it is about thoughts or 
beliefs that provides a basis for classification other than quali- 
tative or relational similarity, it would be a mistake to assume 
. that there must be a single answer to this, question. If we can 
classify some mental states on a basis not qualitatively or relational, 
it does not follow that they must have something further in common. 
As Geach (1976) remarks in the context of expla: j&ion: coincidences 
of events in general call for no explanation; if the separate events 
are explained, that may be that".. . "to look for further reasons-why 
is a typically superstitious attitudel'. 
Sometimes we can -classify together some mental states even though 
they are qualitatively dissimilar and bear no common relation to any 
other item or items. Of course the basis af classification is conn- 
ected with the qualities that a specific state has, and the kinds of ways 
in which they can be related to other items, but the connection is a 
highly complex one. For example, sensory states of the same type are 
related to one another through the common potential for a certain 
relation with an item of a certain type. 
If we take the case of a mental activity such as a decision to do 
something, we can say the following: If a- subject decides to do A 
and then does A as a result of the de_cision, he performs a mental 
activity bearing a certain relation R to his doing A. What actually 
happens when the decision has been made varies from occasion to 
occasion, but particular decisions can be classified together as of this 
type, i. e., as decisions to do A, because they could 
in certain circum- 
stances bear relation R to an act of doing A. 
Mhat allows us to mark 
off different decisions instances of the same type 
is that they could 
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bear relation R to an action of the same type. The example is not, of 
course, a complete account of the nature of decisions or of the relation 
of decision to action. 
A similar account in its formal aspect - can be given for each 
kind of mental state to which we attribut e intentionality or content. 
That is, for each kind of mental item there is some relation such that 
mental items of that kind typically bear that relation to i tems in the 
world - things, persons. events, etc. , such that mental items of that 
kind need not be so related to anything, but such that they are classi- 
fied into types according to their potential for bearing the relation 
in q. u. estion to items of the same type. The account of the relation in 
fact or potentially of dissimilar mental items to an item of the same 
type will depend on the kind of mental item in question - i. e., is 
contextual The explanation may concern, for example, the variety 
of aspects in the experience of a subj ect or the many dif f erent ways 
in which an item can be symbolised. 
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CHAPTER v 
CLAS S IFICAT ION 
0FATTENT10N 
In his analysis of attention White (10,64,1967) states that (all) 
attention concepts share three important characteristics; "First, 
they all demand an qbj ect. It makes no sense to speak of someone as 
just enjoying or taking care or being interested; his enjoym&nt, 
care and interest, like his attention, thought and awareness, must have 
an-ob ject. Secondly, while we can describe all that happens when we 
cry or smile without mentioning what we are crying or smiling about, 
we cannot say exactly what someone is doing who is in any way paying 
attention without mentioning the object of his attention any more than 
we can specify his expectation or wishing without mentioning their 
objects. A careful engine-driver does not differ from a careful surgeon 
merely in the instrument in whose exercise he displays his care; he 
differs in what he does. Thirdly, one cannot give one's attention in 
any way to anything without knowing that one is attending and also 
knowing under some description what one is attending to".. . "These 
three characteristics of attention, which we may call being 'object 
demanding', being 'contextually bound' and being 'self -cognisant', are 
possessed also by such notions as hope, fear, expectation and wishing" 
0aa "Notions like fear and expectation have also a fourth characteristic, 
namely that their objects need not exist except in one's fear or 
expectation; so that one may, expect what will never happen or fear a 
creature of one's own imagination. This characteristic is. sometimes 
called 'intentionality'. Attention-concepts, however - with the 
exception of thinking - are not 'intentional'. 
" 
The large quotation is important and necessary for contrasting 
our own position. If as we claim, perception 
is a sort of attention- 
laden activity, thinking. is not the only 
intentional attention-concept. 
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Even more, perception and thinking seem to embrace most, if not all, 
of our attention-concepts. 
E21 
Because of the many meanings in everyday sense of the word 
attention, from very early on several authors have tried to classify 
attention in. various ways. Boring (1970) specifies ten uses according 
to a chronology of evenýs in'the history of the subject: 
"(1) The personal equation, the indiviCtual differences among 
astronomers in observing the instants of stellar transits (1814-1863), 
'the discovery that led to the study of reaction times. It began as 
a, discovery of individual differences and ended with the finding that 
the expectant attitude affected reaction time (Sandford, 1888; Boring. 
1950,134-151). 
"(2) Individual reaction times, quantities which emerged from 
research on the personal equation when electrical means for measuring 
absolute times (chronograph; chronoscope) had become available (1858 
on to the present; see Woodworth and Scholsbe-rg, 1954,8-42). 
I 
" The complication experiment, which also grew out of the 
of the personal equation, and which examined the interaction, 
as to time of observation, of two synchronous stimuli from different 
departments of sense (1861 and on; see Titchener, 1908,251-263; 
Boring, 1950. ' 142-147). 
"(4) Co=pound reactions, in which were noted the changes in 
reaction time, when the stimulus to the reaction had added to it an 
additional mental act, like discrimination, choice or association 
(1868-1893; Donders., 1868; Boring, 1950,147-149). 
"(5) The span of attention,, the number of items or objects 
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simultaneously clear in perception (Hamilton, 1859; Jevons, 1871; 
Titchener, 1.0.08,259-263; Fernberger, 1-0,21; and on). 
The degree of attention, as to how attention varies in 
concentration and whether it is limited to two simultaneous levels, 
focus and margin (in a sense from Herbart, 1825; Titchener, 1908; 
Geissler, 1909; Fernberger, 1921). 
The unconscious as a lower level of attention when 
attention is equated to reportability (1895 on). 
"(8) Such conditions of attention, as inzensity, suddenness, 
-movement, novelty, and familiarity which deter-raine what enters the 
focus of attention (Muller, 1873; Titchener, 1908,183-206,356-359). 
"(9) The duration of attention,, the rapidity of change of mind 
in flux and the question as to whether an attention can ever be 
sustained at all (Urbantschitsch, 1975; 'Ferree, 1906; Geissler, 
1907; Pillsbury, 1913). 
lf(10) Attention as predetermination or set in respect to reacýion 
time (1888) and also with regard to thinking and goal-directed 
consciousness and behaviour (Watt, 1904; Ach, 1905; and on). 
Ribot (1890) and James (1890) make a clear distinction between 
two different types of attention, one of which they call 'spontaneous' 
attention and the other 'voluntary' attention. Ribot states the 
difference as follows: 
"There are-two well-defined forms of attention the one spontaneous, 
natural; the other voluntary, artificial. The former - neglected by 
most psychologists - is the true, primitive, and fundamental form of 
attention. The second the only one investig, -: -ted by most psychologists 
is but an imitation, a result of education, of training, and of 
impulsion. 
Precarious and vacillating in nature, it derives its whole being 
from 
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spontaneous attention,, and finds only in the latter a point of support. 
I 
It is merely an apparatus formed by cultivation, and a product of 
civilization"; and William James: "Voluntary attention is always 
derived; we never make an effort to attend to an object except for the 
sake of some remote interest which the effort will serve". A modern 
exponent of this view is Luria (1973). 
The. classification of attention in terms of 'voluntary' and 
'involuntary' is not unproblematic. 'Involuntary' not necessarily 
means non-voluntary. This pair of concepts is used in a very confusing 
way: (see Ansco mbe: 'Intention' p, 12). 
Berlyne (1970) classifies attention into two classes: "There are, 
first cE all, INTENSIVE aspects which are a matter of how much attention 
the organism is giving to the stimulus field as a whole. Then there 
are SELECTIVE phenomena, which are a matter of how attention is distri- 
buted among elements of the stimulus field". Besides Berlyne differentiate 
among intensive aspects: I 
1. Attentiveness - the degree to which a higher animal is res- 
ponding to its external environment fluctuates from moment to moment, 
whir-h means, put more precisely, that the amount of information trans- 
mitted from external stimuli to the motor organs fluctuates. 
"2. De I gree of concentration - when information from several sources 
I 
is ýeing poured -into the input of a channel at a rate that oversteps 
the channel capacity, there will be what information theorists call 
'equivocation'. 
"3. Arousal - the word 'attention' has sometimes been used as a 
Sy I nonym for 'arousal' since the notion of a psychophysio logical dimension 
of arousal (Hobb 1955; Malmo 1957; Berlyne 1960; Duffy 1962) 
has come 
to attract wide interest". 
58 
Turning to selective processes Berlyne distinguishes three diff- 
erent ones: 
"1. Selective attention. A stimulus selection is often based 
on spatial location. That is to say, the motor repponse is determined 
by stimuli impinging on certain receptors, while stimuli impinging on 
-other receptors do not af f ect it... "This is the process to which I 
propose that the term 'attention' be confined". .. "Three separate 
problems of selective attention can be outlined as follows: 
'Ta) When an organism is receiving a number of stimuli associated 
with incompatible responses, which will be stimulus whose response is 
performed ? We shall call this the problem of attention in performance. 
"b) When an organism is receiving a number of stimuli while 
performing a response in reinforcing conditions, i. e., conditions 
conducive to learning, which stimuli will''become most strongly 
associated with the response ? We shall call this the problem of 
attention in learning. 
'vc) When a human being is receiving a number of stimuli, which 
stimuli will he be able to remember on future occasions ? We shall 
call this the problem of attention in remembering. 
"2. Abstraction. Quite frequently, the word 'attention' is 
applied to selection not among stimuli entering through different 
sectors of the sensory surfaces, but among stimulus properties that 
belong to. one and the same stimulus object, and thus must be apprehended 
through the same receptors (Mackintosh, 1965). 
"3. Exploratory behaviour. Exploratory responses (Berlyne 1960, 
19632 1966) have the function of bringing sense organs into contact 
with stimulus objects and events that were not previously accessible, 
or of intensifying stimulation from sources that are already acting 
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on the sense organs. " 
Berlyne himself (1960) pioneered a comprehensive treatment of the 
intensive aspects of attention. He studied the so called collative 
properties of the stimuli such as novelty, complexity and incongruity 
which cause stimuli to be more arousing than others. But most of the 
psychologists relegated those studies in the use of 'involuntary' 
attention. In the work. of Kahneman (1973) he tries to account for the 
study of 'voluntary' attention linking the intensive and selective 
aspects devised by Berlyne. His approach consists in suggesting that 
the intensive aspects of attention correspond to effort and then 
proceed to equate attention with effort. Kahneman provides an alter- 
native to theories which explain man's limitation in attention by L 
assuming the existence of structural bottlenecks in terms of a capacity 
model. Accordingly, he assumes that there is a general limit on man's 
capacity to perform mental woiýk. He also assumes that this limited 
capacity can be allocated with considerable freedom among concurrent 
activities (Moray 1967). 
We must notice some important points in relation to the task of 
several authors to deal with the different types of attention: 1) Most 
of the authors discuss attention quite by itself as though it described 
something that could be done on its own, even if we were doing nothing 
else at the time. If attention were a sui generis act, then it would 
be interesting to know whether it could be done voluntarily or not. 
We claim that attention is an activity and not a special mental 
operation, meaningfully divorced from the things we do attentively or 
otherwise. In this context is not whether attention itself is voluntary. 
The question of the voluntary nature of attention would depend on the 
general question of the voluntary nature of our doings in general. 
It 
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could partially explain why the attempt to distinguish between types of 
I 
attention in terms of the presence or absence of acts of will, the 
presence or absence of automatic processes, the presence or absence of 
effort is not completely successful. A different distinction between 
the. different types of attention can be sketched along the lines of a 
different conception about the nature of attention. We will deal with 
this later on. 
2) The other thing to notice is the vagueness in the use of the 
word 'stimulust, This word is used to account for different types of 
element: it is used for the various ob jects in the field and their 
cue properties, e. g. ,a red triangle or the shape of the figure; it can 
be used for, say, the light-waves emitted from the distant stimulus 
which impinge. on the sensory organ; it is sometimes used to specify the 
pattern of excitation on the receptors, e. g., the pattern of the retina; 
it can be used, as well, to refer to. the (postulated) different impulse 
sent by the receptors to the brain. 
Even acknowledging the fact (Taylor 1964), that this sort of 
uncertainty is not a disadvantage at an early stage of the science, 
because we may not yet be clear for which of stimulus element the 
regularities hold, it is essential to be clear, for any type of stimulus, 
what will count as a stimulus element. ' If we are aiming to predict 
behaviour we must be able to give a definite sense to the stimuli which 
'the situation contains or produces'. We cannot simply single out a 
certain kind of stimulus and characterize a situation as consisting of 
such and such stimulus objects. Any object or set of objects can bear 
an indefinite number of descriptions. In order to specify what the 
stimuli are. we have not only to name the objects in the situation, 
but 
also the descriptions under which they operate as stimuli. 
Any set of 
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objects can be classified in an indefinite number of ways and if any 
of these descriptions can count as the ? stimuli produced by the 
situation', there is no finitely enumerable class of things which 
falls under it in any situation. 'And, if some selection must take 
place between these to occur, (in learning for example) this does not 
have to be accounted for by a 'filter-' hypothesis, in terms of cue- 
properties of the objecýts themselves. For the shift from one type of 
discription to another could take place simply because no solution to 
the problem can be found in the first type. That is, the fact that 
reward varies randomly with position, will be enough to induce an 
'animal to abandon the 'attention' to position and adopt one say to 
size. For a critic of the concept of stimulus as used by behaviourist 
psychologists,. see Taylor (1964) and Chomsky (1959). 
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CHAPTER VI 
I 
ATTENT10N 
The information available to us in any situation is indefinitely 
rich but we seem to apprehend only part of it. Some theories have 
been put forward to explain why we notice what we notice. But modern 
theories about attention seem more prone in trying to explain why we 
do not notice all the information available. The answer most frequently 
offered, theoretically seductive but quite misleading, is that we 
'filter it out'. The seductive aspect of this suggestion is that, from 
a formal poi nt of view, it is correct. The formal framework is no 
-other than the mathematical information theory. In it, a filter is any 
input-output device such that, some of the information reaching the 
input has no effect on the output. As Neisser (1976) says: "Formally 
speaking, every human 
. 
being f ilters out cosmic rays, insect pheromones, 
and every other kind of information that does not affect his behaviour. 
Psychologically or biologically, however, this notion makes no sense. 
There is, no mechanism, process, or system that 'Eunctions to reject these 
stimuli such that they would be perceived if it were to fail. The 
perceiver simply does not pick them up, because he is not equipped to 
do so".. . 
"'Selection is a positive process, not a negative one 
However, under the influence of the classical cybernetic paradigm 
in regarding man (or his brain) as a. passive processing system, along 
with the support offered by various psychologists (Broadbent, 1958; 
Treisman, 1960; Deutsch and Deutsch 1963 and others), the filter 
theory of attention has an increasingly popular view (see Posner and 
Snyder, 1975). Several reviews of attention 'nave appeared in the 
literature, but only three contain well-formulated theories. Several 
do little more than to systematize experimental results (e. g. Egeth 
1967). 
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The three models which, have received most discussion have been the 
ones of Broadbent (1958), Treisman (1960) and Deutsch and Deutsch (1963). 
Neisser (1967) provides a review and a model of what he called 'analysis 
by . synthesis'. Norman (1-0168) has elaborated the approach of the Deutsch 
incorporating memory in his model.. 
The first modern model for attention was the filter theory proposed 
by Broadbent in Perception and Communication (1958). He was attempting 
to put together a model of human capability in a wide range of tasks. 
Broadbent sugges ted that the human operator is a limited-capacity 
information channel in the sense of information developed by Shannon 
and Weaver (1949). The peripheral nervous system is able to analyze 
and identify only a limited amount of the information which arrives 
at the sensory inputs. At some point in the nervous system, it is 
proposed, there is a bottleneck a 'selective filter' in the flow of 
information, since the central channel has a lower capacity than the 
combined capacity of the peripheral receptors and neural input lines. 
A limited-capacity channel can carry information in parallel providing- 
the maximum capacity of the channel is not exceeded, but even so with 
the massive amount of information arriving at the body's surface, the 
central processor is frequently overloaded. Broadbent proposes that 
ia order to handle the situation the brain makes a sequential sample 
of the various input channels. The order in which they are sampled 
V aries and the fraction of them which are sampled is variable. This 
-sampling converts parallel input to serial transmission,. so that the 
serial transmitter is protected from being overloaded. At the end of 
the input lines a short memory store is proposed. When two messages 
arrive simultaneously one of them is transmitted immediately, while 
the other is held in store until the line is, free. During its time 
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in store the representation of the message fades, because of autono- 
mous decay and interference from other material that arrives, so that 
by the time it is handled it will be degraded. If the message is 
rejected it does not need to be handled. A diagram of the Broadbent 
model is sketched 
I 
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Fig. 1. Broadbent's Model (After Norman, 1969) 
B-roadbent's theory has strong implications for people's behaviour. 
Some of these implications were tested and proved wrong. Grey and 
Wedderburn (1960) suggested that the selection of sensory channels is 
based mainly on psychological attributes and not physical properties. 
In a listening experiment they presented to subjects one word, 
divided in different syllables, alternately to different ears. At 
the same time another word is decomposed in a similar 
fashion and 
presented to-the complementary ear. If the attention switches 
from 
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ear to ear it is possible to recreate each x-. rord correctly, but the 
result was a nonsensical mixture of syllabes. Treisman's discussion- 
of this problem using different techniques led to her model of 
selective listening, although it can be made to apply to other 
modalities as well. 
. Several messages arrive at once over different input channels and 
the listener must accept one and reject the others ('shadowing' 
experiments). She found a graded effect on the ability of the subjects 
to reject an irrelevant message. When there was a distinct physical 
difference between relevant and irrelevant cha=-els, subjects had no 
dif, flculty in shadowing one without being bothered by the other. When 
the messages had similar physical characteristics but belonged to 
different languages,. they were much less successful. The better the 
subjects knew the irrelevant languages, the'more it interfered. The 
most difficult task was to maintain shadowing one message when both 
were read in t he same language and spoken with the same voice. To 
explain these results, Treisman postulated an analytical mechanism 
that performs a series of tests on incoming messages. The first test 
distinguishes among the inputs on the basis of sensory or physical 
cues; later tests distinguish among syllabic patterns, specific sounds, 
individual words, and finally, grammiatical structure and meaning. 
The pattern recognizer consists of 'dictionary units' which respond 
to patterns of input, providi'ng the input is intense enough to pass 
the threshold of the appropriate recognizer. Treisman suggested that 
the tests at different levels must be flexible, so that if a particular 
word is expected all the tests relevant to selecting that word might 
be preb iased or presensitized toward it. Thus analysis is much 
simplified for items that are expected to occur. The separation 
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between channels is made by attenuating the irrelevant channel so that 
it no longer interferes with the later testing procedure. Treisman 
suggests that all incoming signals are analysed to some extent by a 
sequence of operations. Signals are separated from one another by 
their physical features when that is possible and by their grammatical 
features when that becomes necessary. 
The model proposed by Deutsch and Deutsch is baged on similar 
experimental evidence from that used by Treisman. They state that- the 
'physical characteristics' analyzers early ir. -L the system are redundant. 
All messages are fully analysed at the level of pattern recognition. 
The result of analysis is to produce an output from 'dictionary units' 
which is proportional, not to the signal strength of the input, but to 
its strength weighte'd by its importance to the organism. The weighting 
can be altered by several factors. A detailed account of the weighting 
mechanisms can be found in Deutsch (1960). The selection mechanism is 
'moved back' a bit. In Norman (1968,1969) an elaboration, of the 
Deutsch model is presented which incorporates memory factors as well 
as attention.. We copy a diagram of Norman model and his ox%m description 
(fig. 2 
"All signals arriving at sensory receptors pass through a 
stage of analysis performed by the early physiological 
proce sses. Then, the parameters extracted from these 
processes are used to determine where the representation 
of the-sensory signal is stored. Thus, as shown in 
Fig. 2. all sensory signals excite their stored represen- 
tation in memory. Now, at the same time, we assume that 
an analysis of previous signals is going on. This estab- 
lishes a class of events deemed-to be pertinent to the 
ongoing analysis. The set of pertinent items also excite 
their representation in memory. The item most highly 
excited by the combination of sensory and pertinence 
inputs is selected for further analysis (the shaded item 
in Fig. 2). 
Given the selected item, the attention process now completes 
its analysis, adding the newly acquired information to 
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what has come before and bringing the pertinence judge- 
ments up to date. This scheme is capable of describing 
the existing experimental data as well as the attenuation 
model of Treipman, especially if we allow physical cues 
to be included in the determination of the set of 
pertinent items. " 
Before we continue trying to express our views about the phenom- 
enon of attention, it is useful to take a look at the experimental 
paradigm'and the problems of the modern psychologist who were the 
initiators of the theories of, attention now wiaely held. One of the 
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first studies was carried out by E. Colin Cherry (1953) in America. 
Cherry addressed himself to the problem of 'selective attention' or 
the 'cocktail party problem' as he put it. It is the relative 
familiar task of trying to follow one speaker rather than another 
in crowded rooms. His experiments were designed to the following 
questions (his own words): - 'how do we recognise what one person is 
saying when others are speaking at the same time (the "cocktail 
party problem? ") On what logical basis could one design a machine 
filter") for carrying out such an operraation?? The technique uded 0 
by Cherry requires a subject to repeat a message which is presented 
tohim - to shadow the message while at the same time he is 
presented with other material, either auditorally or visually. 
Cherry reports that the task of Shadowing is easy. But the task can 
be made either easy or difficult, depending upon the details of the 
way it is performed. In the shadowing experiments two main variables 
are analysed: the instrutions given to the subject and the type of, 
material that is being shadowed. The type of material is important, 
for it is easier to shadow meaningful material than nonsense. The 
grammatical aspects of the material are very =portant as Cherry has 
showed: in the absence of physical cues, two different speeches 
mixed -together can be disentangled if there are sufficient grammatical 
constraints involved. In his experiments Cherry reported that 
his 
subject's 'words are slightly delayed behind those on the record to 
which he is listening'. This type of response 
is called 'phrase 
shadowing', and it simplifies the task for the subjects as 
is 
observed in skilled typists. The difficulty 
in the shadowing can 
be increased by instructing the subject to repeat each sound as he 
hears it, without waiting for the completion of a phrase, or 
indeed, 
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without waiting for the completion of a word. This procedure is 
called phonemic shadowing and is very difficult to do. It takes a 
lot of practice for subjects to learn how to do it. 
Shadowing then,. can be as complicated a task as the experimenter 
wishes. Cherry suggests several measures of variables which can 
influence the shadowing: how much effort the subject uses in per- 
forming the shadowing, the possibility of *shadowing interfering 
only with ME11ORY and not with PERCEPT-TON,, etc. In a later series of 
experiments Moray (1959) tried to determine exactly how much infor- 
mat ion humans retain of the rejected channel. He found that even when 
English words were repeated as many as 35 times in the rejected ear, 
there was absolutely no retention of them. Even when the subjects 
were told that they were later to be tested on their retention of 
material from the nonshadowed ear, it made little difference. One 
explanation that was given for these results was the one of invoking 
masking: the sounds of the message which is to be shadowed combined 
with the subject's voice as he repeats that message suppress, silence 
or mask the voice which speaks the other message. Neisser (1967) makes 
reference to the possibility of following two meassages when both 
messages are presented on one loudspeaker at equal volume. Sti113 
another difficulty in the observation that little or nothing is 
remembered of 'the nonshadowed task was put forward by Norman (1969): 
he mentions the fact that the Cherry and Moray experiments waited for 
a while before asking their subjects how much they remembered of the 
non-attended material. Is, the material which receives no attention 
remembered briefly before the subject forgets it ? By simply 
interrupting the subject while he is shadowing, and demand of him a 
response about what was presented in the ear which the subject is 
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not shadowing, Norman tried to give an answer to the experimental 
question. He himself called it the "what -d id-you- say" phenomenon. 
His results showed that there is a temporary 'memory' for items to 
which we are not attending. As a final matter of technicality it is 
useful to give some explanations about the terminology used in those 
experiments. It is necessary to distinguish the various ways in which 
the information might be presented to a sense modality: if we consider 
twol sources of sounds, A and B, which are presented simultaneously to a 
listener, we can present them to one ear only; in this case the presen- 
tation is monaural. If A. and B are mixed together and then presented 
to both -ears, so that both ears hear exactly the same material, the 
presentation is binaural. If the two channels are fed into separate 
ears, each ear with a different channel, the presentation is dichotico 
Similar distinctions can be made for visual material: monoptic, 
dioptic, steroescopic. (Norman). 
The advent of the computer and the spread of the notion of infor- 
mation - in Shannon sense - make possible the interpretation of the 
above experiments in terms that are now standard in cognitive theories. 
Computers accept information, manipulate symbols, store items in 
"memory" and retrieve them again, classify inputs, recognise patterns, 
and s: o on. -A new vocabulary soon 
becomes common place to deal with 
that sort of activity: information, -input, processing, coding, 
subroutines, memory or storage, and so on. The internal 
information- 
processing model of cognition was postulated to explain the real 
cognitive activities. The old philosophy had created unsurmountable 
problems by its views about the 'seeine of the retinal 
image. The 
modern doctrine regards that image not as looked 
but as processed. 
'Detectors' initiate neural messages in response to certain specific 
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features of the image. Information about these features is then 
passed on to higher stages of the brain. At higher stages it is com- 
bined with previously stored information in a series of processes 
that results in perceptual experience. That is in essence the 
information-processing model of cognition that was put to work to 
explain the experiments about attention. With someadded modifications 
(a "filter") to this inf formation-processing model the 'attentional 
phenomena' was nailed down *into a computer. It is a matter of looking 
into the different variables influencing the experimental paradigm 
and trying to account for one of them as the 'basic' one that explains 
the differences among diverse theories. We have seen already that 
the'theories of Treisman and the Deutsch place the "filter" at 
different levels. Kahneman's theory emphasizes the aspect of the 
effort given to the task and tries to account for att. ention in terms 
cE a capacity model which performs "allocation policies' on the grounds 
of effort to spen d. 
Another characteristic of all those models is the sharp distinction 
between perception and memory (Neisser, 1976). Any use of information 
a few milliseconds after it was presented, any anticipation is regarded 
as dependent on memory rather than perception itself. Norman's theory 
of attention, for example, states that we continuously 
'registei! and 
then forget a lot of incoherent sensory fragments. Evidence. to 
back up the processing theory. comes from experiments where more 
infor- 
mation is obtained from an 'unattended' voice than the early experi- 
ments had suggested and from studies that show that 
knowing where 
(to what ear, in what sense modality, at what place) a 
brief stimulus 
will be presented, does not help subjects to 
detect it. (Shiffrin and 
Gardner, 1972; Shiffrin and Grantham, 1974). But as 
Neisser (1976) 
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says: "they (the experiments) are just as irrelevant to natural 
attention as traditional tachistocopic research is to perception. We 
do not attend to ears, modalities, or points in the visual field, but 
to objects and events: we do not do it in an instant but over time". 
Theories like the one of Triisman and Norman are unnecessarily 
complicated. Behind them there is the implicit assumption of man as 
a passive processor. When attention is treated as an activity, as 
something we engage in actively, we do not need to look for the 
existence of different internal mechanisms which would implement the 
diverse manifestations of attention. 
Selection requires no special machinery. This could be shoxm if 
that selection occurs for every sort of perception, even where neither 
practice nor evolution is likely to have provided a selective mechanism. 
Neisser and Becklen, 1975; Neisser, 1976 devised a visual analogue 
of the selective listening paradigm. They videotaped two kinds of 
'games', and then used a mirror to show them in full visual overlap,, 
rather as if a television set were somehow showing two channels at 
once. ' Subjects were asked to attend to one of the games and ignore 
the other, pressing a response key at every occurrence of certain 
targets events in the attended game. The results were clear. At an 
-event rate of about 40 targets per minute, it was nearly as easy to 
fo llow one game when it was superimposed on another as if-it was shown 
by itself. The error rate was only three percent, (3%) and subjects 
had no difficulty even on the first trial. In the same way that a 
subject can shadow a primary message in the presence of an 
irrelevant 
voice, so it is possible to follow a visually given primary event 
and ignore another equally present to the eyes. 
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In examining the above models critically we ought to mention 
only some unsurmountable "technical" points that the different models 
are not able to cope with. However, our main claim is that the analysis 
of attention under those approaches is misleading in looking for 
different mechanisms which would implement different 'stages' of the 
processes. In the next section a different approach under more realistic 
and productive lines is sketched. The -other general comment worth 
mentioning is the ambiguity of the terms 'stimulus', 'signal' and 
'channel' which are non consistently specified in the different models. 
In Broad-bent's model it is proposed that the probability that a 
certain channel will be sampled when it eventually contains a signal 
increases with the length of time which has passed since the last time 
that it was sampled. ' The 'channels' were originally thought of as 
being fairly closely identified with sensory pathways, but this is no 
longer acceptable since, language or voice quality can be used as 
criteria for' selection, even verbal classes have been used. If the 
'filter' acts on peripheral inputs it is hard to see how the verbal 
classes which have meaning and not phonemes or frequency components 
can be implemented. Not even Moray (1969) modified version can 
explain all the data. 
In Treisman's model the 'attenuation' of signals has not been 
made very clear. For example, the properties of the attenuation and 
how it works are not specified. In later versions of. the model 
Treisman incorporates 'analysers' to describe how the various features 
of a signal may be independently processed. No predictions can be 
made as to what will happen if the listener is asked to handle two 
simultaneous input, accepting them both. As Norman (1969) puts 
it: 
"The main argument against Treisman's explanation concerns the 
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complexity of the operation she proposes. " 
I 
Similar difficulties face the model proposed by Deutsch and modi- 
fied by Norman. A source of difficulty is probably the use of 
shadowing as the method of presenting stimuli. It is virtually 
impossible to measure in this experimental set up the effect of slight 
timing differences that could be crucial in the understanding of the 
phenomenon. On the other., hand as a general deficiency in all the 
models is-that they concentrate entirely upon co-impetiton between 
inputs. The likely 'competition' among outputs, and between inputs 
and outputs is not easily handled by any of the models. All the above 
difficulties seems to call for a better experimental set-up and more 
quantitative measures in order to reach for sorne clarification of" the 
issues involved. Our claim is that most of the analysis carried out - 
in, this area are the product of a conceptual muddle. As Geach (1957) 
has put it*. "No experiment can either justify or straighten out a 
confusion of thought; if we are in a muddle when we design an experi- 
ment, it is only to be expected that we should ask nature cross 
questions and she return crooked answers. " 
C23 
How can we conceive or explain the phenomenon of attention ? 
We must remind ourselves of the context in which we are pursuing our 
enquiries - cybernetic and system theory We ought to look for a 
holistic view even when the prospect seems so daunting. The quotation 
from Wittgenstein at the beginning of this work in his distinction 
between a foreground and a background and the more recent works of 
Atkin (1974) who differentiates in a holistic structure, a dynamic 
related part (the foreground in Wittgenstein term) and a related part 
regarded as fixed or static,, adequate to 'support' the 
dynamic part: 
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the bac, kcloth (the background in Wittgenstein term). It is necessary 
to remark that the 'backcloth' or 'background' is not static in the 
strict sense of the term, but it only means that its DYNAMIC is 
slower than the 'foreground'. William James in a description of the 
phenomenon of attention makes. use of a similar distinction: "Every- 
one knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind, 
in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously 
possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, 
of-consciousness are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from some 
things in order to deal effectively with others, and is a condition 
, whir-h h-as a real opposite in the confused, dazed, scatter-brained 
state which in French is called distraction, and Zerstreutheit in 
German. 
"We all know this latter state, even in its extreme degree. Most 
people probably fall several times a day into a fit of something like 
this: the eyes are fixed on vacancy, the sounds of the world melt 
into confused unity, the attention is dispersed so that the whole body 
is felt, as it were at once, and the foreground of consciousness is 
filled, if by anything,. by a sort of solemn sense of surrender to the 
empty passing of time. In the dim background of our mind we know 
meanwhile what we ought to be doing: getting up, dressing ourselves, 
answering the person who has spoken to us, trying to make the next 
step in our reasoning... " 
In'the above passage it is possible to spot an ambiguity 
in the 
way James, talks about the object of attention 
"in clear and vivid 
f OrMP. If the object of attention is itself vivid and clear, even 
the 'minimal' attention given to it will show it with clarity and 
vividness but that characterization is the one of the object of 
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attention. On the other hand, if the object of attention is itself 
vague and amorphous, the more clear and vivid we see it the more 
vague and amorphous it is seen to be. 
We must notice that most of the theorists who try to describe 
attention make use of visual metaphors: focalization, concentration, 
etc. It. is useful. to use the visual analogy because its description 
is richest and more elaborated than their alternatives. But as 
Evans (1970) remarks: "we must be watchful not to be deceived by the 
analogy into thinking that what is true of the analogue is true 
generally; for. it might be that we are unwittingly dealing with a 
non-analogous feature of the analogue". 
Tf we concentrate or focalize our attention on something, that 
concentration and focalization takes place around a centre. In this 
way the 'centre' stands out of its 'surroundings': the centre being 
the f6reground and the surroundings the background. 
The sort of attention present in all the above experiments is x 
conscious selection, i. e., is deliberate; but it is wrong to suggest 
that all attention is deliberate. Even when the attention paid to 
an object is compulsive, it does not mean that the subject could not 
turn his attention to other 'elements' of his consciousness if he 
were able, that is, we are aware of other objects or events present 
in consciousness at the same time we are pay ing attention to an 
object or event, otherwise we would have no contrast between attention 
and non-attention. Our attending to A cannot be fully described 
without some mention of a concomitant awareness that we are not 
attending to B, C, or D. The existence of elements -of consciousness 
to, which we are not paying attention provides a background or 
back- 
cloth to those elements to which we are paying attention. 
We can 
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account for Eonsciousness as consisting in the existence of a plurality 
of'elements' some of them occupying the foreground (object of 
attention) and others providing the background. When we change our. 
attention one object of attention is replaced by another, but the 
structure of consciousness is still the same. So in the view fore- 
shadowed by James (1890) and Ribot and made important by Evans (1970) 
attention polarizes consciousness into a foreground and a background. 
In the special case of the attention paid to an object which catches 
our eyes by a sudden movement, the foreground and the background 
stand in consciousness in a relation of juxtaposition. No special 
-rel-at-Lan b. etween the two 
is present. It. is this characteristic that 
allows some people to talk of 'spontaneous' attention in this specific 
instance, however we are able to spot an incipient state of differen- * 
tiation even when the relation between the two seems to be quite 
irrelevant in most of the cases. 
The situation is different when we look to other types of 
attention - the case of a search (in the literal sense). In a search 
we have an _TDEA of what we are 
looking f or, even when the 1DEA is 
not necessarily clear. For example, sometimes we come across the 
object of searching and we do not recognize it. This sort of attention 
does not have its success guaranteed. We must not think that because 
the attender can give a rough indication of the object of his search, 
the object of the search is also the object of attention at the time 
of the search. If that were the case, the attender, we would say, 
would be thinking about finding as opposed to being actively engaged 
in looking. The object of attention are either -the places consecu- 
tively searched or the searching activity itself. We have some other 
factors in the searching like the expectation and the 
'set' , that 
is. 
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beliefs about the place to search, the probability of success., etc. 
One important factor in the search is that the attender may have some 
idea of the state of affairs that would constitute the successful - 
termination of the search. Such an idea can play an important part 
in determining the manner in which the search is. carried out. If 
wi 11 p-a rtly determine the things we do and the things we notice or 
not while searching. Iý is q sort of 'informant' idea and is this 
what can be compared to a 'filter' in the sense that it determines 
what gets through and allow us 'noticings' apt to the search. We 
. -can see a 
difference in the conception of 'filter' in the classical 
view of attention and the present one. In the current models the 
filtering is carried out by some 'mechanisms' inside the brain. C: 1 
the present account,, the 'filter' is no other than the IDEA 'informing' 
the search. 
How can we con'ceive the 'informant' idea ? Is the 'informant' 
idea the object of attention ? The answer to these questions are 
important because if we allow to the idea to be the object of 
attention during the search, we are not talking any more about the 
search itself, but about the thought of an idea or it may well be 
about the planning of the search. On the other hand, if we conceive 
of the 'informant' idea as a disposition in the sense of a memory 
of previous acts we miss the point. On that account in order that 
the idea be actual in the search, it has to be recalled from 
'memory'. 
But the actuality of the 'informant' idea in the present account 
does not derive from it being recalled. The 'informant' 
idea is 
present during the search as an element of the background or 
back- 
cloth of consciousness. In this sense the idea though 
being actual 
at the time of searching is not itself the object of attention. 
In the whole structure of consciousness the ýackcloth "supports" 
(Atkin, 1974) the dynamics even if people are not aware of it. It 
explains the fact that some people become surprised when they realise 
that an 'informant' idea is guiding the search. Is that what in one 
sense constitutes the intentionality of most of our activities (see 
above). However, there is a point in conceiving the searching 
activity as a disposition: if in the middle of a search one forgets 
what one is looking for, the forgetting must be understood dispositionally 
because the object of the search is neither in the foreground, nor is 
an element of the background, and we have very good behavioural elements 
how to settle the matter: the search either stops searching, or he 
fails to recognise the object of his search when he comes across it. 
This account allows us to look at the expectation and 'set' of the 
subject not in terms of a disposition but in terms of an organization 
present in consciousness: a foreground and a background. 
Another characteristic of the current theories about attention is 
the postulation, implicitly or explicitly, in the limited subject's 
capacity for processing information. As Neisser (1976) says: 
"Acceptance of this assumption frequently goas along with some form 
of f ilter theory: a special mechanism is postulated to protect the 
1 11 M 71ted capacity from overload". How the belief in a fixed cognitive 
capacity comes about? In the case of the current theories of 
attention it stems from an argument derived from the mathematical 
theory of information: a theorem in this theory asserts that when 
the rate of information input to any finite channel exceeds a certain 
value (called the channel's capacity) not all of it can be transmitted 
without error. If we put forward the idea of the brain as a trans- 
mitter of information, and bearing in mind that the brain 
is finite, 
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the above theorem is a proof of the limit to humi-an capacity. 
We have to go along into this argument because nothing, in principle, 
seems to attest against the validity of it. However no-one has ever 
demonstrated that the facts of selective attention have any relation to 
the brain's real capacity. Besides, there are a lot of activities 
which we can continue doing without danger of overloading a cerebral 
storehouse: we can continue visiting places, and meeting people, as 
long as our energies (and money) last. However human abilities do have 
limitations. 
. 
Some of them are explained by lir-diting factors specific 
'to the combinations of. individual activities and skills involved. As 
Neisser (1976) has put it: "Consider our physical abilities: they 
are obviously finite, but their limitations do not arise from any 
single source, The limits on how fast we can run is not based on the 
same factors as the maximum weight we can lift; the sharpness of our 
visual acuity is not constrained by whatever sets the minimum oculomotor 
reaction time... " 
Most of the time the performance in a dual attention activity can 
be tremendously improved according to practice. There are differences 
between 9killed and unskilled subjects that the current theories fail 
to explain. Moray (cited by Underwood., 1974) improved his own detection 
rate in the secondary channel to 83 percent in a task where naive 
subjects average 4 percent. The sophistication of the subject, his 
age and his culture (Lackner and Garret, 1972; Mackay, 1973), produces 
different results in the assigned task and these differences are not 
explained in the current theories of attention. Some of the difficulties 
which arise when people try to do two things at once has to do with 
incompatible movements required by the body. In some of these tasks a 
re-organization in the execution of the task may produce 
improvements. 
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However,, we must not fool ourselves thinking that all the limi- 
tations are explained by limitations in bodily activity. Some real 
limitations ari se in the cognitive realm when we try to attend to 
more than one object at the same time. It is common and acceptable 
to say. that. it is not possible to pay attention to too many different 
things at once. The impossibility or difficulty of following two 
separate conversations at once as used in the paradigmatic experiments, 
is but a common example of this limitation. It. is fair to say th<-3. t 
in the experimental case, there is a conflict for a subject trying to 
pay'attention to the two messages at once. It is that conflicting 
situation which obliges the subject to settle in paying attention to 
only one message and "reject" the other. (In the experiments it is 
usual to ask to pay attention only to one message anyway). But not 
every case of attending to more than one thing at once are cases of 
a conflict of attention. How can we settle the matter ? Empirical 
contrivance seems to be the best answer for it. This belief has 
arisen a lot of experiments in order to discover the switching time 
of attention (Cherry and Taylor, 1954; Schubert and Parker, 1955, - 
Bro, adben t, 1958; Kristofferson, 1967; Moray, 1969). If we examine 
the question more closer we notice that we have not settled yet 
what is to be understood by "attending to one thing at a time". 
Since our view is holistic and not atomistic2 we suggest that part 
of the problem in answering this question arises because of the 
implicit pressuposition in atomic objects such that we could make 
decisions as to what is one object or another, quite 
irrespective of 
the purposes of the subject. In fact, that which constitutes 
the 
object of attention resembles one of the characteristics- 
laid down in 
the functioning of a concept i. e. , fact organized 
(see above). The 
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object of attention, whatever it be, gives rise to the organization 
of consciousness around it. Whatever the object of attention -a 
person, an event - it is still a complex object, but we do not pay 
attention to the 'ultimate fundamentals' (if any) of a person or an 
event, though we notice a variety of things of the object of attention. 
To know about the object of attention we need to know about the 
purposes behind attention. The activity is dependent of the purposes 
of the attender. This account opens up. the possibility of explaining 
several things present in the attentional phenomena. 
If the organization of consciousness produced by one object of 
attention is in conflict with the organization produced by another 
object of attention, then we have conflict and the attention is 
"divided" between the task or'there is a "switch" between one and 
another task or we settle ourselves in one task "rejecting" the 
other. The resultant organization must be looked upon as a system. It 
is that system and the complexity inherent in it which allows us to 
explain the incompatibility or compatibility if different objects of 
attention present at the same time. When two objects of attention 
compete for the subject's attention and they do not belong to the 
same system, we can only attend to the one at the expense of the 
other. If several objects of attention belong to the same system, 
we can pay attention to all of them. The system itself and its 
complexity, depends on the sophistication of the subject and that 
allows to explain differences in age and culture. The degree of 
attention paid to an object of attention is greater if that object 
belongs to a well defined system occupying the foreground of 
consciousness, and if the connectedness between 
foreground and back- 
ground of consciousness is soundness. If foreground and 
background 
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merge together in a system the concentration of attention is maximal. 
We have said nothing about the content of the foreground and 
background of consciousness. Are they cognitive or sensory ones ? 
The answer is in the affirmative in the cognitive case, as when the 
subject is immersed in the solution to a problem (the object of 
attention) and an "informant" idea in the background, guides the 
solution like in the example of search given above. But the content I 
of consciousness can be sensory too, as when we are engaged in 
performing a manipulative task that requires great skill (the object 
of attention) and our kinaesthetic sensations give us control over 
our movements without paying attention to them (the background). In 
fact, if we pay attention to our kinaesthetic sensations, that would 
disrupt the task being carried out as everyday common experience 
testifies. 
. 
The classification of types of attention in terms of voluntary 
and involuntary attention (Ribot, James, Luria) is unsatisfactory, 
but besides, it accounts for the differences in attention according 
to differences in its origins in motivation. Now it is undeniable 
that any type of attention must have certain motivation, but it does 
not impljý that the evolution of the phenomenon must retain the same 
motivation. In logic- this sort of argument in which the antecedents 
of something must be the same as their consequent, is known as the 
Genetic Fallacy. The nerve of the argument, and it is an argument 
which comes up all over the place, is that if X evolved from Y, then 
X must always be Y; or at least, it must always be really or 
essentially Y. Yet this argument is absurd. For to say that X 
evolved from Y implies that X is different from Y,. and not the same. 
A classification in terms of the connectedness between 
foreground 
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and background seems to'be more sound. Evans (1970), has suggested 
a classification on this line: a) unordered attention - where the 
relation between foreground and background is almost non-existent, or 
at least not necessary to explain the attentional phenomena; b) execu- 
tive attention - the one present when a performance is carried out, 
and c) 'interrogative attention - the attention paid to an object in 
order to enlarge our knowledge. In this latter case the connectedness 
between foreground and background is maximal. Of. course, this classi- 
fication must be regarded as tentative and incomplete. In any case 
it requires experimental support. 
We have been regarding attention as an activity by which conscious- 
ness is structured in terms of a foreground and a background. The 431 
foreground has been identified as the object of attention, and the 
background as the 'support' of the dynamics of the foreground, which 
in some sense is determined by. them. Now we seem to face a difficulty 
here. In the specific example of searching given before, we emphasized 
that the object of attention is the different places being searched, 
and not the 'searcli itself. Likewise, when we see a person or listen 
to any sound in the environment, the object of attention is the person 
in the first case, or the specific sound in the second. But none of 
them Can be an 'element' of consciousness. Certainly no specific place, 
person or sound is 'inside' consciousness, being one of 
its 'elements'. 
The solution suggested to overcome this difficulty 
is to regard the 
places searched and the persons looked at 
"as-they-are-seen-by-the- 
subjectfl, the sounds listening to "as-they-are-heard-by-the-subject". 
In this way we have a difference between the object 
itself (whatever 
that is) and the object as seen, heard, sensed, etc. , by the subject. 
We can the explain why, in some cases, the subject 
does not 'see' 
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'hear'. etc., the 'real' object of attention. The foreground is 
occupidd by the object of attention as experienced by the subject. 
The technical term used by 
'Evans 
is awareness. Thus, the object of 
attention is always an awareness of the subject but not every aware- 
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ness implies the existence of a 'real' object. Once again, it is 
well to remember that the experience or awareness we are talking 
about has to be understood in an occurrence ser-se and not in a 
dispositional sense. When we come to consider awareness in a dis- 
positional sense, the word is used as a synonym for 'know'. For 
example, a person can be said to be aware of the way of solving a 
specific problem, even though he is not at the time thinking on them. 
Equally, we can say of the person that he knows the way of solving 
the problem. 
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We come now tD make a short survey of some of the enormous liter- 
ature about attention and to see if our view can claim experimental 
support. The first thing to notice is that the term attention still 
embodies a lot of "neb ulous empirical and conceptual difficulties". 
(Vaughan and Ritter, 1973). Already in. 1969 Berlyne commented: 
"Hitherto, there has been a tendency for neurophysiologists to assume 
that the psychologists know what attention is, and for psychologists 
in turn to assume that the neurophysiologists know". 
We have sketched before the different connotations that the 
phenomenon of attention has for the psychologist (selective attention, 
arousal, vigilance, search behaviour, eet., etc. ). Recent demonstrations 
of 'secondary pickup' have turned out with the fact that more infor- 
mation is obtained from an "unattended" message than the early experi- 
ments had suggested. In the analogue selective looking experiment 
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mentioned above devised by Neisser and Becklen (1975), the subject is 
able to follow the attended game (the object of attention) but does 
not see the irrelevant game, although "there is a sense that something 
else is there" (an 'element' of the background). The traditional 
theories make no distinction between skilled and unskilled subjects, 
between adults and children, or between those, who are trying to pick 
up information from the secondary message, and those who only want to 
ignore it. Even more, assuming that the 'filter' becomes more 
efficient wIth age or experience, old and sophisticated subjects should 
pick up less information than younger and naive ones. Hawkins (1973) is 
a modern exponent of that point of view, but the success of this view 
is very'littleý In our theory an attentive activity either a perfor- 
mance or a 'pure' cognitive one is prone to improvement if we re-arrange 
our skills or try different strategies or policies. Moray (cited by 
Underwood, 1974), improved his own detection rate in the secondary 
11 
channel to 83 percent in a task where naive subjects average 4 percent. 
In experiments with subjects doing two things at once, (cited by 
Neisser, 1976) the subjects reading stories silently while copying 
words that the experimenter dictated one after the other 
(each word 
was presented as soon'as the preceding one had been copied) the 
results sliowedthat at first the dual task was found 
difficult, the 
subjects read much more slowly than under normal conditions. 
After 
about six weeks of practice, however, their reading speeds 
had 
returned to normal, Careful tests showed that they were also 
reading 
with full comprehension. 
The picture that seems to emerge from the 
diverse experiments 
is that attention is not a 'fixed mechanism' 
but must be seen upon 
"as a collection of acquired skills" 
(Neisser, 1976) - that - "will 
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adjust itself to the requirements of the task at hand, and only rarely 
will fundamental limits be observable" (Moray and Fitt-er, 1973). The 
latter authors have postulated a model of attention in the following 
way: 
"We must cease to regard the properties of attention as f ixed. 
They -are largely task determined, either directly (through the inter- 
action with transients), or indirectly (by means of the construction 
of an internal model of the statistical properties of the sources). 
There may be a few cases in which limits on performance are found, 
owing to the observer switching continuously at his maximum possible 
rate,. but they are rare, and the evidence for them is distinctly thin. 
Attention is dynamic, with changing temporal parameters, and directed 
by the following: 
It 1) 
I 
the observer's model of the temporal statistics of the 
information source or sources he is processing, the model generating 
a distribution of expectancies as to the likely t Lme of arrival of 
the. next target; 
"2) the observer's model of the costs and values associated 
with the detection or missing of targets from the various sources; 
"3) (perhaps) his sensitivity to transient changes in the auto- 
correlation functi-on of. the physical signs. 
"Attention thus is seen to be rather the employment of dynamic 
strategies than the operation of a fixed mechanism - strategies, 
moreover, determined by a continually updated assessment of 
the 
informational demands of the sources being monitored. Attention thus 
is seen to be intimately connected with the acquisition of 
skills, 
expectancy theory, decision theory, and probability 
learning. The 
man who successfully pays attention 
bears a resemblance W the virtuous 
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0 man in the moral theology of Aguinas: it is not by his struggle to 
overcome temptation that we detect his virtue, but by the untroubled 
achievement of his aimý'. 
The large quotation is necessary: the authors are psychologists 
who have worked extensively in attentional experiments, their views 
thus, are important. The theory -has a lot of advantage over the current 
theories of attention: for example, it rejects the idea of a 'fixed 
mechanism' and besides it allows for improvements and variations 
according to the task. If we can come to grips with the theory we can 
better appreciate its claim and have a good anchor frota which we can 
measure the differences with our view. 
The theory is scattered with the use of terms borrowed from 
information theory, probability and statistic theory, etc. There is 
nothing intrinsically wrong with that. The sampling theorem of infor- 
mation theory states that if we have a signal of bandwidth W Hz, then 
an i, deal transmission line can transmit all the information in the , 
signal, provided that 2W samples of the signal are taken per second. 
Senders (1964) made extensive use of information theory in the 
earliest analytical theories of attention. He argued that when an 
observer is required to transmit information from a number of sources 
of -visual information, he is behaving as such a transmission line. 
It follows that there is an optimal strategy for such an observer. 
The model has undergone evolution. Elkind and Gringetti (Senders et 
al, 1966) argued that the. týsk was not really one in which the signal 
was transmitted. It was designed to notice the moments at which the 
value of the signal exceeded some defined value and that the observer 
used the latest observation as a base line from which extrapolate 
in 
time to make the different samples. Carbonell (1966) later developed 
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a model where he made explicit the role of costs, values and payoffs. 
The sources queue for'attention. T. he observer uses his knowledge for 
decisions as to which source to be sampled, he learns how to assign 
values to several sources, etc. The mathematical approach to the 
solution of this sampling problem is intractable unless restrictive 
simplifying assumptions 'are made. Sheridan (1970) has presented a 
general model which incorporates Bayesian statistical decision theory, 
and. again is concerned with the calculation of an optimal sampling 
interval, or distribution of intervals, providing the observer knows 
the statistical structure of the source. 
In analysing the implications of these results, Moray and Fitter 
(1973), state that they imply that the observer knows the value of 
I W, the bandwidth of the signal, with considerable precision for each 
source he observes. He must therefore have learned the statistical 
properties of the source and using such knowledge to control his 
sampling behaviour, he has constructed an internal model of the 
environment to which he must pay attention, and that model controls 
his attention. 
We must notice that all the experiments consist of an 'infor- 
mation flow' situation. No wonder may arise if the subject 'behaves' 
-as an 'information transmitter' and it is of value in this context 
to apply the formal apparatus of information theory to know the 
characteristics of that 'channel'. Where the thing goes wrong 
is in 
equating attention with information transmission. We have been 
arguing that attention is an activity of the organism by which the 
field of consciousness is structured in a foreground and a 
background. 
Most or all of the experiments deal with the 
"structural information" 
characteristics of the foreground. They do not take 
into account the 
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background and the connection between the two in explaining the 
attentional activity and how the background can "sustain and support" 
the dynamic activity. 
We have to elaborate about this criticism to make clear our claim: 
the use of awareness or 'experience' - in the technical sense that we have 
been using them - allow to refer to any proper object of perception 
without having to list the different modalities visual, auditory, 
etc. ). Thus, it resembles the word 'consciousness' except that the 
latter brings in elements to which attention is not being paid in 
addition to those to which attention is being paid. The object of 
attention - the awareness of it - is a whole, a system and cannot be 
regarded as 'constructed out' of sense-data. The awareness has the 
property of continuousness. How long can an awareness last ? If we 
keep bearing in mind the connection between alqareness and activity - 
bodily activity that goes with it, the answer is that the awareness 
lasts as long as its sustaining activity lasts. If this contention 
holds, as we assume 'it does, a single awareness or experience exhibits 
qualitative changes because of changes in bodily activity, the activities 
in question must be attentive activities. Attentive activities are 
those which cannot be fully described without mention of the sense 
. organs used in that activity. 
The point of the activities in question 
is to keep the awareness (be it visual, auditory, or any other) in 
'check'. For example, in order to keep the awareness of looking at 
X we have to see X, listening to Y entails hearing Y. The two 
activities: seeing and hearing, entail a corresponding awareness. 
Some specific bodily activities functions in order to sustein percep- 
tual awareness. Of course, the 'sustaining' of all awareness is not 
dependent upon bodily activities alone, as for example 
in the aware- 
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ness of a fleeting event. Most of the sense-activities are exercised 
attentively: looking, listening, feeling and so on are attention- 
laden concepts. So also are other higher order concepts like perceiving, 
thinking, enjoying, where the activity in question requires that 
concomitant present activities might be detected. On some occasions 
engaging in an activity attentively necessitates engaging in another 
activity - thinking, for example - at the same time. But the second 
activity. is not itself a sui generis activity of attending. 
[41 
When we come to look at attention from the physiologist's point 
of view, we notice that they have taken a fairly casual view toward 
the need for a precise definition of attention. For the physiologist, 
attention has to do with whether. or not stimulus information reaches 
some unspecified level within the nervous system. As Vaughan and 
Ritter (1973) state: "It is assumed that the afferent activity 
generated by unattended stimuli gets suppressed somewhere along the 
way, and, conversely, that activity generated by attended stimuli is 
likely to be enhanced relative to neutral stimuli. Thus, physio- 
logical contributions have been limited to speculation on the neural 
structures involved in t he enhancement or suppression of sensory I 
input,, and attempt to demonstrate the existence of the postulated 
afferent modulation". The physiological approach to attention has 
been dominated by the important ideas generated from the knowledge 
of the role of the reticular formation in the modulation of arousal. 
The experimental evidence gathered by several authors (Moruzzi & 
Magoun, 1949; Lindsley, Schreiner, Knowles, & Magoun, 1950) demon- 
strated the role of the midbrain reticular formation 
in the EEG and 
behavioural manifestations of arousal. Subsequently the cerebral 
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extensions of the brain-stem reticular formation the 'non-specific' 
thalamic nuclei -, were postulated to control focal and phasic shifts 
in cortical activation related to selective attention (jasper, 1960). 
However, it is not known what sort of modulation has to be accounted 
for by the mechanism of attention attributed to the thalamic reticular 
system. 
Hernandez-Peon (1961) and his co-workers were involved in experi- 
mental studies in this field. He employed two basic experimental 
procedures: 1) Recordings of sensory-evoked potentials to monotonously 
repeated stimuli. It was presumed that the EP amplitudes might covary 
with fluctuations in attention. 2) Recordings of evoked responses to 
the presentation of repetitive stimuli and its amplitude variation 
while another, 'highly significant stimulus was delivered before, during 
and after the presentation of the former repetitive stimuli. It was 
presumed that the repeated stimuli were not attended during presentation 
of the distracting sýimulus. 
His findings suggested attenuation at the first nucleus of the 
respective sensory pathways when the stimuli were presumed to be 
unattended. It was postulated a centrifugal inhibitory action of the 
reticular formation on the specific sensory nucleus. -In fact, 
experimental evidence has showed that in the cat, for example, fibres 
arising in the medulla pass along the auditory nerve toward the 
cochlea (Rasmussen, 1946). Electrical stimulation of these fibres is 
followed by a reduction in the response of the auditory nerve to an 
acoustic stimulus (Galambos, 1956). But as Horn (1965) has stated: 
"There is nothing inherently improbable in the hypothesis that these 
centrifugal fibres play an important role in selective perception... 
but the question is whether there is any physiological evidence to 
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support it. Not all the evidence claimed to support the hypothesis 
does so in any direct way". 
The experimental findings of Hernandez-Peon have been criticized 
not only by Horn but by Worden (1966) in an extensive and effective 
way: the magnitude of the changes observed was extremely small, 
of the same order of size as found in spontaneous fluctuations. There 
was no averaging of responses- to increase the reliability of the 
records. On the other hand, the experiment has proved remarkably 
resistant to efforts to repeat it. Thus, the role of centrifugal 
modulation of afferent -activity in sensory and attentive process remains 
undefined.. The evidence from psychological studies (Moray, 1959) is 
not consistent with the hypothesis of afferent Tneuronal inhibition. 
Most of the re sponses of a subject are dependent not upon physical 
parameters, but rather on the cognitive significance of the stimulus, 
therefore peripheral input attenuation would seem at most to represent 
but a limited feature of attentional mechanisms. 
Other efforts to detect evidence of attentional effects on input 
have observed evoked potential (EP) at the cortical levelli including 
human averaged EP, and used that as physiological index. The experi- 
mental approaches again have employed changes in the size of the EP 
.9 
as a criterion of loss of attention. In a review of the literature, 
Moray (1969) refers to this criterion in the following way: 
"Compare 
for example, the magnitude of the voltages which can be recorded 
in 
the EEG of sleep, and the waking EEG.. The huge synchronized 
discharges 
of deep delta7-wave sleep are among the highest non-pathological 
voltages which can be recorded, and yet the organism 
is almost totally 
unresponsive. If we were to assume that size of evoked potential 
was an index of activity, we would have to conclude 
that the human 
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observer is intellectually most lively when he is f astest asleep". 
Other cortical potentials has been used like the association 
cortex potential (ACP), (Vaughan, 1969; Vaughan and Ritter, 1970) a 
long-latency positive component of the EP which appears whenever a 
stimulus is presented unexpectedly or a sensory discrimination is 
f 
required,. The ACP dif f ers f rom the' EP in relation to the f actors 
dete-rmining their latency and amplitude. EP parameters are defined 
primarily by stimulus variables, and the ACP by task variables or 
stimulus significance. The EP is stable in latency for given stimulus 
parameters!, the ACP show remarkable fluctuations in latency. But 
these studies as previously stated, suffer from the validity of EP 
amplitude measures., Potential shifts of greater duration that the 
transients of the EP (that is >500 msec) commonly called steady 
potential -shifts, has been correlated with changes in arousal level 
. 
(Caspers, 1963). However, the most important steady potential shift 
was described by Walter and colleagues (Walter, Cooper, Aldridge, 
McCallum '& Winter, 1964) as a cortical sign of tonditioning. This 
negative steady potential shift is the contingent negative variation 
(CNV) which appears in the conditioned response to the pairing of a 
ITconditional" and an "imperative" stimuli. It was described initially 
as a cortical sign of expectancy and was alleged to originate from 
widespread. sources in frontal cortex. Subsequent investigations by 
Walter and others have led to a number of modifications and quali- 
fications of the early descriptions. In view of the possibility 
that a number of intracranial sources as well as extracranial sources 
of potential shifts (skin and corneoretinal potentials) may 
be 
contributing to the scalp-recorded steady potential shifts, a good 
deal of work remains to distinguish fact from artifact 
in human -scalp 
steady potential shifts recordings. At present, most authors admit 
that all in all we know little of importance at the physiological 
level in connection with selective attention (Moray,, 1969; Vaughan & 
R0 itter, 1973). The latter authors state that: "Once it is acknow- 
ledged that attention must be viewed as a manifestation of extra- 
ordi na. rily complex and varied neural transactions, the fruitless 
search for simple 'neurophysiological correlates of attention' finally 
will be abandoned". 
E51 
We ought to mention, though briefly, our position in the mind- 
brain identity theory of the mind-body problem, if only because in 
recent years a number of schoýars have put forward the thesis to the 
effect that mental events are identical with certain physiological 
events,, (Place, 1970; Smart, 1963; Nagel, 1970; Armstrong, 1970). 
The theory attempts to show that an event considered typical of the 
mental, like a sensation or the having of an after-image, can be 
considered to be identical with a process in the brain, or some 
physiological process in the body as a whole. Granted that further 
research in neurophysiology2 biochemistry and so on will produce 
results which will confirm the thesis beyond further objection, the 
search is for a set of correlations between the having of after- 
images, and so on and brain process. Those correlations are the 
'ground' of identity theories. Every mental event must be invariably 
accompanied by a given brain process. Some authors have used as 
analogues for the identity theory, the lightning and the electric 
discharge, but because the identity in, this case - namely, sameness 
of location - is not applicable in the mind-brain 
identity since 
mental events cannot be given as precise a location as physiological 
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-events, the weight for the thesis rests in the ability to correlate 
events of the. two kinds - mental and physiological. 
It has seemed to many materialists that the discovery of those 
correlations is plausible because the only alternative of explanation 
is to hold some sort of 'interactionist' view, that is, mental and 
physical events being happenings of fundamentally different kinds 
which are in causal intýraction with each other. 
One way of deciphering the difference between the two views is 
as follows (Taylor, 1970): 
(1) On the non-interactionist view, human behaviour is explain- 
able using only laws and conditions governing events on the physical 
level. On the 'interactionist' view mental events are sometimes 
causes, of physical events. 
(2) On the 'interactionist' view, it is possible (both logically 
and ontologically) to be mental happenings, not linked with any 
physical happening. On the non-intdractionist view the ontological 
possibility is denied and though, not denying the logical possibility 
of disembodied mental happenings, the possibility is denied as far 
as human mental- happenings is concerned. 
The interactionist view is on the wane now. The idea of disem- 
bodied thought or feeling is not very credible these days (see 
however, Eccles and Popper, 1977). Thus, if all behaviour can be 
explained in physiological terms, then the thoughts and feelings we 
have will be by-products on those physiological cnnditions to which 
we must refer to explain behaviour. So if we discover correlations 
linking thoughts, emotions. etc.. to physiological happenings, we 
must consider them as identical with the physiological conditions 
with which they are linked. The idea seems more plausible 
because 
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of the implausibility Of interactionism. But, can we discover 
correlations between certain mental happenings and the holding of 
certain physiplogical conditions' ? The answer requires some elaboration: 
even granting the possibility of explaining behaviour by laws and 
conditions expressed in physiological terms, it does not follow'that we 
can discover correlations between thoughts, or emotions and physiological 
happeniAgs. We have no guaran . tee that the same phenomenological thought 
will be accompanied by the same brain state or a finite disfunction of 
brain states in the same person, not to mention all human beings. 
The existence of law-like regularity at the physiological level 
which enables control at the psychological level, does not mean that we 
can discover one-one or one-many correspondences between the two terms. 
It pressuposas the existence of a definite range and only one exact mode 
of classification of a set of phenomena. We can, certainly, explain any 
behaviour at the psychological level by concepts and laws at the 
physiological level, and that can give a more fruitful explanation. 
However, granted the discovery of explanation of behaviour in 
physiological terms, and that mental events are not independent of the 
physiological but susceptible of explanation themselves in physiological 
terms, it does not mean that we can discover correlations between mental 
events and brain states, even a finite disfunction of them. The validity 
of this assertion must rest on empirical discovery. But the use of some 
mental events like an after-image, or a heel-pain being correlated with 
specific neurophysiological happenings has lea to the idea that the 
same type of correlations can be found for some mental happenings as: 
hatred, dicision, love and so on. The more inclusive or universal the 
mental event, the less plausible is to suppose a correlation. 
That 
may explain the stock of examples used by the 
identity theorists which 
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reflects back in their empiricist tradition. But even if theories 
of general identities between mental and physiological events are 
not invulnerable, a given mental event will be mediated by some 
physiological happening and particular identities can be established. 
But the possibility of a systematic replacement or 'reduction' of 
I 
phenomenal vocabulary by physiological terms is a very far-fetched 
possibility. Mental events can occur only if mediated by the physical 
events of which they are the reflection, or on which they are dependent 
in some way. This relation between the physical and the mental can 
be described using the concept of 'embodiment' (Taylor, 1970), andlin 
this sense even when no mental event can occur without the corres- 
ponding physical embodiment - for example thinking in terms of a 
corresponding pattern of excitation in the brain - the physical 
embodiment may differ from case to case, and for phenomena which can 
be described at more than one level, in more than one mode of classi- 
fication, it is not possible to determine 4 priori which level will - 
yield explanations of the phenomena which will enable us to predict 
and control them, or which level will -yield the most fruitful expla- 
nation. 
In any of our experiences - looking at some picture, for example 
more than one neuronal event is involved. But if several neurones 
are involved in the process it is extremely unlikely that the same 
events will be involved in any other experience of looking at the 
same object. We can have diverse conditions at the peripheral level: 
lighting conditions may be different, the height at which the picture 
is being hanged may be different, we can see it through glasses or 
without glasses, with one eye closed and so forth. In this case, we 
have different neuronal events Jnvolved and yet phenomeno-logically tlie 
'k- 
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ex. perience is indistinguishable. Of'course, it is possible to maintain 
that the processes are identical at upper levels - the visual cortex, 
say - but as is well known from physiological experimentations (Lashley, 
1929; see Bartlett & John, 1973)- the destruction of a small amount. of 
neural tissue of any area in the cortex is compatible with the normal 
functioning of the araa - in our case we have the same phenomeno- 
logical experience. On the other hand, the events that condition the 
f iring of neurons in the cortex are so complex that it is extremely 
unlikely that the same set of neur ons would fire under any two or more 
perceptual situations. Some aspects of human activity, as in the case 
of certain pathological conditions, no doubt, can be more successfully 
explained on a physiological or biochemical level, but there 'are many 
other groups of behaviour where this is far from being the case, and it 
may be that a better explanation can be given in psychological terms 
which can have a teleological form: such and such in order that so- 
and-so ýp in order that q). 
Identity theory as a thesis asserting particular identities - 
a heel pain explained in terms of tissue damage or nerve excitation, 
for example, is unquestionable and could be seen as identical with the 
thesis of a universal embodiment (Taylor, 1970 p 240). that is, all 
mental events are mediated by physical events - but once accepted in 
this form the identity claimed by the theory turns out to be relatively 
uninteresting. The theory has the virtue of being one of the most 
serious attempts to come to grips, conceptually, with a continuously 
increasing body of neurophysiological knowledge. Its implausibility 
cannot be seen as expressing the view that the only way out 
is to 
accept interactionism. In fapt, an alternative more plausible view 
under the name of information processing theory 
(IP theory) has been 
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put forward by Sayre (1969). According to this theory, "neuronal 
events constitute the channels by which information deriving from 
sensory stimulation is processed into conscious responses. 
Consciousness is the processing and not the activities in the nervous 
system by which the processing occurs. One might say also that the 
-neural events between receptor stimulation and cortical response 
are the code elements by which information is passed along for 
processing. To assert that consciousness is identical with the 
neural events rather than the processes they support, is to confuse 
the code with the information". 
0 
100 
C0NCLUS10N 
CONCLUSION 
We have been arguing that attention consists in the structuring 
of the field of consciousness into a background and a foreground; 
the object of attention acting as a centre which organizes consciousness 
around it. How can we account for the change in consciousness - i. e., 0 
different 'objects' 'moving' from foreground to background and/or out 
of consciousness? one way is to appeal to introspection. 
There is a view in psychology asserting that, psychological concepts 
are abstractively derived from inner experience. This inner experience 
, is a sort of quasi-sense related in some way, tophysi-cal occurrences. 
It is supposed that we form a concept of judging or desiring by 
discriminatIvely attending to, and performing abstraction. upon, the 
retrieval of this 'introspect ive' quasi-sense. The quasi-sense is 
compared to seeing - intr6-spection -. There are some peculiar diffi- 
culties with the notion of 'inner sense' which make them untanable 
(see Geach, 1957). At any rate in our case it is a8ked to make one's 
blank and rely on the memory of such states. As we have been 
asserting throughout we are dealing with a 'fluid' situation and it 
is very' difficult to tell, in retrospect, which element was in the 
fore at a particular time. 
An explanation of the situation is offered by'Ribot (1890) and 
under similar lines by Wilson (1972): attention is grounded in the 
emotional nature of the organism. Ribot sta tes his-view as follows: 
"Any animal so organized that the impressions of the external world 
were all of equal significance to it, in whose consciousness all 
impressions stood upon the same level, without any single one pre- 
dominating or inducing any appropriate motory adaptation - were 
exceedingly ill-equipped for its own preservation. I shall overlook 
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the extreme case, , 
in which predominance and adaptation would favour 
detrimental impressions; for an animal th-us constituted must perish, 
being an illogical organism -a kind of incorporate contradiction. 
The usual case remains, viz., the predominance of useful sensations, 
that is, of those connected with nutrition, self-defence, and the 
propagation of the species. The impressions of prey to be caught, 
of an enemy to be avoided, and from time to time, of a female to be 
fecundated, become settled in the, consciousness of the animal with 
their adepted movements. Attention, thus, is at the service of and 
dependent upon necessities; - always connected u-ith the sense most 
perfectly developed, the sense of touch, of sight, of hearing, of 
smelling, according to the species. Here attention is seerL in all 
its simplicity, and here it affords the most instruction. It was 
necessary to descend to those rudimentary forms, in'order to grasp 
the reason of its power: - attention is -a condition of life; and 
it-will preserve this identical character in its higher forms, where, 
ceasing to'be a factor of adaptation in a purely physical environment 
it becomes, as we shall see, a factor of adaptation in the social 
environment. In all the forms of attention, from the lowest to the 
highest, there is a unity of composition. " 
Wils-on (1972, p 185) states, in a related context: "(3) The 
machine's behaviour has some coherence, for it can act at different 
types in pursuit of the same goal. But the various ends that the 
machine pursues do not in themselves form a coherent system. If 
they relate to one another, it is only through their common external 
imposition. The totality of a person's behaviour and of his ends 
of action does have a kind of'coherence. There are two distinct ways 
in which different things that a person does can form a coherent 
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whole. As with the machine, different actions can add up to a single 
complex of behaviour because they are all directed to the same end. 
But different actions can also be part of a unified whole because 
they all arise from the same feeling or attitude. This is a distinct 
type of principle of unity of beh aviour. In general, a person's . 
actions, and the different ends he tries to achieve, are brought into 
relation one with another, mainly through the feelings and emotions he 
has in particular situations, and through his longer term attitudes 
towards the things and people and institutions around him, and towards 
himself in relation to these. " 
We agree with Ribot that a subject cannot be absolutely indifferent 
to his environment, otherwise there is no reason for him to pay 
attention to changes taking place in the environment to which he is 
aware. Even more, if the environment ceases to matter to the subject 
any more we hesitate to say that the subject is conscious of his 
environment. We are not saying that every event. person, etc., that. 
catch the subject's attention has an emotional significance Lor the 
subject. If attention is grounded on emotional states, not every 
instance of attention is caused by an emotional state. As far as the 
environment is of interest to the subject, every perceptible change 
in the environment taken by -the subject to be novel produces an alert 
reaction in him (the 'arousal reaction' in physiological terms). 
That novel stimuli can arrest the sense-organs of the subject quite 
involuntarily. We are all familiar with the fact that many startling 
stimuli do not arrest the relevant sense-organ* It happens when the 
subject is exposed to a number of repetitions of the stimuli, (the 
'habituation response') and we can talk properly of an inhibition. 
But the inhibition at issue is not a 'physiological inhibition': the 
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stimulus is still 'picked-up' . What the subject inhibits is any 
further reaction to the stimulus. 
Any subject or animal Jevotes most of his waking life to any 
sort of activity: looking about, listening and so on. These activities 
are natural and occur spontaneously at certain stages of normal growth. 
As we said above, the activities in question involves the movement Of 
sense-organs. It is natural to think that to engage in some attentional 
activities we must suspend some movements. If we engage in looking at 
a picture attentively, we must suspend the movement of looking around. 
Thus, in some cases in order to pay attention to an object we must 
'fixate' the movement of the sense-organ concerned in order to be 
successful. In other instances we must use our sense-organs movements 
in order to pay attention to the 'object of attention' as when we watch 
a tennis match for example. 
We must not loose the thread of the argument because if we can 
account for a unity of behaviour in different terms of efficient goal- 
directedness., it can partially explain why a machine is seen as 
I 
inadequate as an analogue of man. Thus, human activity not only is 
goal directed (most of the time those activities are loosely related 
to the ends) but the goal in itself has some meaning, which may or 
may not be justified, but is comprehensible and that comprehenslon 
springs from feelings and attitudes (Wilson, 1972, p 186). When we 
try to explain behaviour we can, and very often do, use the notion 
of end or goal and that end can be given sense by reference to. more 
distan t and/or general goals. But it can also be given sense by 
reference to an emotion or attitude. Quoting TY'ilson once more: 
"The many feelings and attitudes that a person has themselves 
form a coherent whole, though not an entirely -consistent one. 
A 
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person may have many contradictory and conflicting attitudes and 
beliefs, and even in particular situations ambivalence and inconsis- 
tency of feeling is common. But such inconsistency exists within a 
larger coherence. A person's total outlook, the whole collection of 
his feelings and attitudes and' beliefs and opinions and views as to 
what is and ought to be the case, his expectations of others and 
conception of himself, his notion of what life is all about and of 
what is worth striving for, makes sense as a network of interconnected 
items loosely strung together, not as a logically ordered, hierarchical, 
self-consistent system. " 
If we base a subject's activity and its ends as rooted in feeling 
and attitudes we are explicitly stating -that the view of rationality 
of man which is based only in terms of mean-ends is, to say the least, 
incomplete. We must account for feelings and, attitudes as not opposed 
to reason. The view already stated according' to which consciousness 
consists of a foreground and a background allow us to see how an 
emotional state can b, e jointly present with a state of awareness. The 
current criticism of emotional states as feelings is ill-founded. It 
is based in the presupposition according to which feelings and experiences 
belong to the same subject. As Jobnson (1978) in a similar context 
h-as put it: "Wherever there are experiences there is the (logical) 
prerequisite of experience. Kant took for granted that the experience 
and the prerequisites' 'belong' to the same person; hence the person 
must "know' the prerequisites. There is a view which says that we 
must divide here: experiences belong to the learner, the prerequisites 
to the reflective observer".. . "If we mean by 
'experiencing' being the 
person whose physiology (or hardware) is buzzing with activity, then 
the experience is without a doubt that person's. But if by possessing 
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these experiences we mean being in the best position to name, recount 
and appraise them, then it is an illusion (created by the Cartesian 
inheritance) that the one to whom these 'experiences' happen is in 
the best position to tell what these events are. To have -the exper- 
ience, in the sense of being able to tell what they are, is a function 
of the relective observer and no other. " 
Most of the criticisms advanced against the 'feeling theory' of 
emotional states point in the direction of a lack of evaluation. We 
do distinguish between shame and embarrassment, for example, by 
reference to how the subject perceives the object of emotion. Even 
with subtle differences in bodily patterns associated with the two3 it 
seems that the basis of the distinction is that it is necessary for 
shame but not for embarrassment that the subject take the object to be 
something which is his f ault. The presence of such evaluations seems 
to -be what makes bodily states and sensations emotional. It has been 
claimed that no perceptual evaluation of. the appropriate sort can be 
completely unemotional but it still remains true that two persons can 
see a situation as equally dangerous, yet one be much more frightened 
than the other. Thus, being frightened cannot consist only in seeing 
something as dangerous, since the degree of fright can vary without 
a variation in the perceptual evaluation. As we have pointed out above, 
that evaluation belongs to the reflective observer. It could mean 
that we are heading-for some sort of objectivity, but the objectivity 
at issue cannot be the objectivity of the 'reversible'. (Piaget and 
Inhelder, 1958, Piaget, 1968). Reversibility is a certain concept of 
objectivity which naturally goes with a picture of the real as a system 
which can undergo a coherent set of transformations, that 
is, something 
which would ideally be -manipulable in a coherent way, and connected with 
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this it implies that we abstract from their significance for us in 
coming to grips with them. But the objective understanding and 
explanation of our emotions need to have different characteristics. 
Above all there is no point in abstracting from the significance for 
us what we are ex ining in trying to understand one's own feelings. 
If we abstract from 'their significance to us" we are shifting our 
0 object of study, and in some way failing to come to grips with the 
original problem. In fact any substantial gain in our understanding 
of our feelings changes them in ways which are often irreversible, 
either factually or intellectually. Thus, the objectivity we are 
pursuing here is different. The conceptualisation of that different 
sort of objectivity has to bring in notions as tendency that are- 
intrinsically -teleological in character. The concept of consciousness 
will be inextricably bound up with our idea of how it develops. And 
this fact cannot be thought of in the traditional sense as a 'value free' 
science. but neither it must proceed with any less regard for empirical 
fa ct or care in formulation and testing of theories. 
By way of summary it is desirable to stress the following points. 
Attention is regarded as an activity of the person. The activity 
is 
seen as an iuter-relatiou between the subject of experience and 
his 
environment. It means that we must cease to see attention either 
as 
a statistical property of the object 
(the source of attention) or as 
a specific mechanism inside the subject which allows 
to enter in 
some stimulus and reject the others. If at all, 
those properties 
belong to the inter-relatiou between a person and 
his environment - 
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his activity - and this activity is at the service of the purposes 
of the subject. 
It is argued that the object of attention produces a structuring of 
the field of consciousness by means of which the object of attention 
stand in aforeground constituting the awareness of the subject. In 
order to sustain that awareness some sort of activity is required. 
The activity in question is related to the sense organ used in that 
activity. (see page 90) 
The object of attention itself is considered in holistic terms - 
i. e. a system as considered in General System Theory - and not as 
something 'constructed out' of sensory stimuli. Hence conflict Of 
I 
attention comes about when the activity of the subject has to deal 
with 'different systems'. But depending on aiot of factors: culture, 
skill, age, etc. those different systems can be embedded in a larger 
one which can be comprehended by the subject. 
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APPENDIX 
There has been a. loi"'6f work in the area of modelling in order to 
get a realisation of the description of mental processes. 
Beurle (1954,1959) used activity in mass cell arranged in such a 
way as to produce regenerating impulses storaging and manipulating 
information in such cells. 
One of the most inclusive models is the one of Pask (1975). His 
model was devised as a realisation of the description of a concept 
and concept learning. 
Essentially, the same ideas can be used to represent a description 
of the attentional phenomena. The following part iculari sat ion, 
appropriate to this study, has been constructed to provide an 
interpretation in th e field of attention and its occasional 
specificity. The elements of the specialised model may all be 
units as described by Beurle (above) although, in fact, non 
linear oscillators were employed for this implementation. 
The implementation is one realisation of a free production s6heme 
described in Pask (1977,1978) for a derivation (see Pask above) 
of a "topic" T from a topic P. and a topic Q (this author alludes 
to the genera tors of topics as stable concepts, that are 
derivable 
fr=-oth-dr-ar A, B, stand for "participants" (for example, organ- 
isms), which have DB (or Description Building) and 
PB (or Procedure 
Building) operationsin their cognitive equipment. 
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Ex, stands for execution of a process; T, P, and Q are different 
topics of fuhich A participant, A, has a stable concept for 
P and Q to begin with and derives a stable concept for T. 
.ýpA 
Waveform 
(PA IQA) 
I 
ExQr2SP) 
I% 
Oscillator Waveform 
Ex(Proc 
A 
Q) QA 
_Oscillator 
Waveform 
1-1 
1q 
Oscillator 
Free-Processor 
Waveform 
Ex (Proc , 
>y(ý 
(P T, f2: MAQ, Yti (PA"QA» A' QA 
it is assumed, initially, that oscillators (corresponding to the indef- 
I-2. -2---2---? t_ --II_-- 
.rL utý. AZ 
CILLU ZLU 4- %. ( 4. LL LL. JL 0 6. L LL%- 6 11 L %j %- = .20WA. a/ 
exiit and are turned on, to emit waveforms PA and QA (the descriptions 
computed by and ProcAQ). If used as input to the device, 
with parameter i, the waveforms are combined and form, for some 
value of i, 
IN 
the waveformq i (P AIQA ). A further deviceA . with 
parameter j accepts as input fE22e, ProcAQ and the combined wave- 
formll i (PAPQA)p such that for some value of j, there is created 
or programmed in a free independent processor, ark,, : independent 
oscillator emitting the waveform (P A, QA). 
To clarify the 
matter one serial or sequential approximation to the 
(actually 
parallel) process9 so described, is as follows. 
Switched off Oscillator 
. (Proc P, Proc AQ9 
I i(PA'QA)) 31 
117 ýý' T 
Ex (Pr p 1A Ex (ProcAQ) QA 
fi 
1 
I 
Read listing 
ProgAP iU 
a 
Proc P =A Prog P, Inter. 
'ý 
Read Yj i (PA OQA) 
I 
Read listing 
Pr2SAQ in 
Pr2EAQ ' <-PrO-9, Q, Inter 
Combine Pr (some value EZO-UP and Pr of i inAj) to form 
- 79 li (P AIQA)) 
Interpret program in free processor (fresh Inter,, ) to give 
J( (ProcAP, "ro Q, YL i (PA,, QA)) - 
Trial execute the combination interpreted, and ascertain if 
results in *q i (PAIIQA) - 
If, and only if, this is so, for at least some value of i 
(the- parameter of Ili) , 
instate the combination 
Qv 19 
tentatively, Proc A T. 
(P A"QA)) and call the combination, 
If not, then change the value of i (in j) and thus the 
combination of PENAP and ProUQ- Return to step 
4 in process. 
Execute (tentative) ProcT so that Ex(Proc T)=ý TA 
(tentative) . 
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This serial approximation of the coupling process involving device 
and device/( which may, otherwise be regarded as a complex form of 
resonance involving, for^, combinations of descriptions of 
os(Lllators (their structures) and, for A, combinations of the 
descriptions generated by these oscillators (theic wavef orms) 
using the notation of Pask (1977,1978) a procedure, for example, 
Proc AP or Proc aP (another participant, B) is specified as 
Proc 
2 
IatelA> <220? 
; Ap p Aý 
P <PE2hP, ILit te r 
. 1) 
where Prog is a program or algorithm and Inter is an interpretation 
I 
open to execution by participant A (or B). 
QA 
Program or switched off 
m" oscillatorAj(Proc. p. 
Proc. *Qqli(PA3, QA)) 
4M 
Pro$Fým_ or switched of f -', -I 
osc3.1. Lator Yroc p 
'A 
Program or switched off 
oscillator? ýj(Proc P, 
Proc. Q2VIi(PAvQA)) 
A 
A% 
ProSram or switched off 
oscillator Proc Q A 
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I 
Waveform 
Switched off oscillator 
Proc 1 Q. 
Free Processor 
Oscillator Waveform 
Proc. P 
Free Processor 
Osciflatk - WanfonR 
If, for some values of parameters i and j, the conjugate and converse 
transformations (together with the further pair of free processors) 
are able to satisfy the stipU'lated conditions Ili (PA, QA) is known 
at T, and j (ProcAP, Proc Q, (PAgQ, ) is known at ProcAT. If A 
these requirements are satisfied, then the originally assumed Proc AP 
and Proc AQ 
have been constructed as Proc P and Proc A Q. Further, 
there are conjugate and converse transformations which yields a 
Proc T, such that Ex(Proc T)-='ýT Under these circumstances the AA 
devii ce p ai r YL *f orms a DB operator and the device pair =-=A ýi 9 )1 
* 
forms a PB operator; also is an oscillator and'ý( is, z-; --A 
in this context, an oscillator. 
To Others 
I 
I 
Flq 
others 
Xi-Xi 
Ex(C 
I 
on I 
"Ex 
(CC AQ 
I 
Ex(Con 
4 
Q 
4 
0 
0 
ý) .x (DB ) -qi)*q I =; -A 
"I(Minilroum 2 units) 
40 
Stacks of at least one 
-Z. more processor than used 
to execute VI , Vt orti 
Stacks of at least one 
more processor than those 
used in the execution of 
afimp "'-Con P or Con Q or Con T. A ==A 
, OZ- 
e, 
ý. 
EX (LB Kj, i- A) 
(14inim= 2 units) 
From Others 
This is a minimal, or nearly minimal system of oscillators for 
a stable concept, which is one implementation of a free 
production scheme as realised by partly synchronised collection 
0 
of machines such as an array processor with initially 
asynchronous modules. The system is informationally open as 
well as organisationally closed, insofar as the-lines shown 
as "from others" and "to others" exist, - that 99T Proc P; Proc 11 
PA'? QA A: AA 
Procj may be constructed in other organisationally closed systems, 
and the products of this system be more coherent with ot1her 
systems. The essential point is the realisation of the "in 
Con" relation,, where "Con" is a semi-coherent cluster of proced- 
ures (for example) Con T is specified as Con 
A 
or A A7 =- -1'r-OcAT 
fProcAT 
. i4 . 7, 
or jj Proc T) where ', C I' signifies a 
coherent set of processes and signifies an unordered., set., 
Evidently----very many physiological mechanisms as well as electron- 
ic mimicries will satisfy these conditions and maintain specificity 
without appeal to a par ticul arTransmitter/Channe 1 /Receiver model 
Empirically, the system is stable and correctly images, for example, 
McCulloch's "Redundancy of Potential Command", though without 
committment to particular physiol6gical identification. 
The arrangement acts as a complex multiple mode oscill- 
ator, -the stability and unity 
of which depends upon an information 
transfer in the sense of. Petri. This property obtains 
because 
the model is not a computer simulation but an actual process 
(compare this with the simulation on a serial machine, of 
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McCulloch-'s "redundancy of Potential Command" where, regardless 
of, -the detailed neuroanatomical image, the transfer of in- 
formation is also, necessarily, simulated by a probabilistic 
component and a "random" input) That is necessary because 
the prior independence of the unit oscillators or active filters, 
is, ir% tfirrr simulated and the "random" input is present in 
order to simulate, independency or incoherence, allowing for 
the appearance of partial coherence or dependency 
A manifestation of partial coherence; or dependency, is a trans- 
ient hierarchical organisation, certain modes of non linear 
oscillation being (transiently) dominant Here, these modes 
are the "topics" T, Pt Q, or combinations of topics; in that 
sense a system. said to "know V may "attend to" Tor to P)or 
to Qetc. This implementation is interpreted 
and identif ied with the more general ideas of my 
thesis' as follows. One topic (at least) will constitute the 
"foreground" and the remainder the "background" ; for example, 
if TA is the "foreground", thenp A and QA are the 
"background". 
Details of this implementation ) 
"Using the elements of a Fuzzy 
Set sim6lator (see '. photograph) ý and its interpretation 
are given in research Memorandum, (F Hernandez Chevez 
(1978) 
System Researchor a paper (Hernandez Chevez (197%) below); 
This equipment (the photograph) is intended 
for studying 
concurrent processes. It consists 
in a (pfogrammible) collection 
of analogue integrators and linear and non 
linear multiplying 
and threshold elements; delay, logic, and switching 
modules; 
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impulse counting shif t registers with location storage for 
setting up either parameter values or event sequences. Replica 
hArd wired implementations of "relational operators". acting 
upon small finite sets (such as "join" and "projection"). The 
implementation was hand simulated only with regard to providing 
the free processors from "stacks", and this amounted to switching 
in further oscillatory modules, as required. 
I 
As a less*trivial exercise (for the implemented oscillator system 
is only a tool of demonstrative value), it has been possibke to 
use special runs with the team decision system (ARI Grant DAERO 
76-G-069) at System Research Ltd. In this system, each participant 
has multiple display and programmable control of up to 2x2 
"vehicles" normally employed in a complex command and control 
task butin this casefor data gathering. 
It was possible in these special runs to couf irm the predicted 
effects with human subjects engaged in human decision making. 
This work-is described in a forth-coming publication 
(Hernandez 
Chavez (in press) ). 
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